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Drugs and Revolution: The Effect of Narcotics Revenue on Rebel Group Goals 
 
Abstract 
This thesis seeks to answer the broad question: how does drug funding affect rebel group goals? 
More specifically, it explores why rebel groups reliant upon substantial narcotics-related 
revenue tend to be non-separatist in nature.  The thesis tests three cases against five hypotheses 
in order gain a better understanding of the mechanisms that produce non-separatist goals 
among drug-funded rebel groups.  This includes an examination the development of narcotics-
fueled war economies, the role of state weakness in civil war, the reasons for non-separatist 
conflict perpetuation, as well as the discipline problems that arise as a result of a rebel group’s 
involvement in the drug trade.  The three cases analyzed in the thesis, that of the FARC in 
Colombia, the Shining Path in Peru, and the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia,  present 
comprehensive external validation of the paper’s theoretical framework.  This paper finds that 
state weakness, the breakdown of discipline within rebel groups, and the tendency of rebels to 
perpetuate conflict for profit maximization provide strong evidence of the reasons for the non-
separatist nature of most drug-funded civil conflicts. 
 
I. Introduction 
Prologue 
What impact do lootable resources have on civil wars? How does the presence of lootable 
resources in a civil conflict affect the behavior of rebel groups? Why does rebel access to 
lootable resources increase the likelihood a civil conflict will be non-separatist in nature (Ross 
2004)?  Examining rebel group revenue sources helps explain how the availability of different 
types of funding affects rebel group strategy and goals.   
The funding environment for rebel groups underwent drastic changes in the early 1990s. 
The demise of the Soviet Union led to the immediate withdrawal of substantial financial and 
other resources that the USSR had funneled to rebel groups (Steinberg 2000).  Indeed, the years 
following the breakup of the USSR saw a number of longstanding conflicts resolve themselves, 
as support from the Soviet Union disappeared and anti-communist posturing no longer 
guaranteed funding from the United States (Steinberg 2000).  The “new world order” of the post-
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Cold War compelled numerous rebel groups to replace superpower funding with new sources of 
revenue in order to sustain their operations. 
Despite the drastic change in the availability of superpower funding in the post-Cold War 
environment, a number of civil conflicts around the globe underwent curious escalations in their 
severity. Why did this apparent contradiction occur? Like any other rational organization whose 
existence depends on sustainable revenue streams and loses a key source of funding, many rebel 
groups sought to and succeeded in replacing lost income through the exploitation of lootable 
resources, in particular the cultivation, trafficking, and sale of illicit drugs. Illegal narcotics 
transformed into a new financial “superpower” for many rebel groups, allowing civil conflicts 
across the developing world in Columbia, Peru,  Afghanistan, Mexico, Lebanon, and Myanmar, 
to endure and intensify throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  
Why do the sources of rebel group funding matter? Put simply, without money, rebel 
groups cannot sustain participation in civil conflict. Unlike participants in international wars who 
tend to include militaries funded by state governments, the inherent illegality of rebel groups 
makes access to funding a critical contributor to their organizational viability.  Rebel 
organizations require revenue at a level that not only sustains their core operations, but also 
allows them to compete effectively with governmental adversaries supported by tax-collecting 
bureaucracies.   The sheer cost of building and maintaining a rebel army makes rebellion 
prohibitively expensive in many instances; as a result, understanding both the conditions that 
allow for a financially viable rebel group to exist and the ways rebel groups think about funding 
their operations comprises a key element of any explanation of civil war. Access to certain 
funding sources – or a lack thereof – compels rebel groups to adapt both their internal structure 
and external strategy in order to match future expectations of revenue.    
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What are the mechanisms by which rebel group access to drug revenue causes changes to 
their strategy, goals, and tactics?  Does the exploitation of certain revenue streams – illegal drugs 
in particular – cause rebel organization to alter their goals regarding secession versus complete 
state takeover in fundamental ways? The type of revenue streams to which rebel groups have 
access – whether through the extraction of gemstones, taxation of a civilian population, extortion 
of protection money, international donations, kidnappings for ransom, or activities involving 
illegal drugs – have considerable effect upon the stated grievances of an organization, the way it 
recruits its members, its relationship with civilians, its ability to sustain civil conflict, and most 
relevant to this paper, a rebel group‟s decision to proclaim separatist or non-separatist goals. 
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, civil wars began to replace international wars as 
the most common form of large-scale violence (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner 2008). The reasons for 
the persistence of civil wars, which tend to exceed international wars in duration by more than 
ten times, carry important implications for policymakers around the world interested in 
preventing and ending conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner 2008).  The longevity of civil war, 
combined with the tendency of these conflicts to wreak havoc on the economy and political 
stability of the countries and regions where they occur, has led many scholars to argue that 
prevention of civil conflict stands as the most important security priority of the twenty-first 
century (Gleditsch 2003).  In addition, the substantial degree to which rebel groups fund their 
violence using funds obtained through the sale, cultivation, and distribution of illegal narcotics, 
often to developed countries across Europe and North America, makes the issue of rebel funding 
quite pertinent for policymakers outside of states torn by civil conflict. Understanding the ways 
the economic opportunity presented by the drug trade combines with domestic political 
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environment in foreign states may prove necessary in establishing a strategy to obstruct the 
multi-billion dollar global drug trade. 
Above all, this paper asks the question: how does drug funding affect rebel group goals? 
Why do rebel groups reliant upon substantial narcotics-related revenue tend to be non-separatist 
in nature?  The paper examines the decisions rebel groups make through the lens of how they 
fund their organization, with the aim of filling a gap in the existing literature on civil war 
regarding the precise mechanisms that produce this non-separatist tendency among drug-funded 
rebel groups.  The relation between the core organizational strategy of rebel groups and the 
methods they use to generate revenue as opposed to more typical examinations of the goals, 
strategies, and tactics of a rebel group, remains an area with surprising little study given its 
importance to the execution of civil war.  
Literature Review 
A number of studies since 1990, both qualitative and quantitative in nature, have 
explored how the presence of natural resources affects the likelihood, severity, and duration of 
civil conflict. Many of these studies have found a strong statistical correlation between a state‟s 
reliance on the export of natural resources, and either the likelihood it will suffer from civil war 
[Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001], or the duration of civil wars once they commence [Fearon 
2001] (Ross 2003). 
Although many of these studies do not focus on the impact of illicit lootable resources 
such as illegal drugs, these studies require examination in order to understand the current 
literature on the relationship between economic resources and civil conflict.  While drugs may 
not come to mind when thinking of natural resources, they do in fact fall within the definition of 
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“natural,” as many of these substances either occur naturally or are cultivated in conflict zones 
and often have been for centuries (such as the coca plant in Peru or opium poppies in Burma).  
In their 1998 paper, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Collier and Hoeffler argue that 
under certain conditions, civil wars will arise if rebel groups calculate the incentives for rebellion 
to outweigh the costs of war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998).  Collier and Hoeffler find that the 
effect of natural resources is non-monotonic in its relationship to the likelihood of civil conflict: 
the presence of natural resources increases the risk of war but only up to a certain threshold 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998).  In other words, up to a certain limit, the taxable base of the 
economy provides an attractive target for rebel groups; yet at very high levels of natural 
resources, governments gain such substantial financial capacity that the risk of war decreases 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998).  For example, the military of the United Arab Emirates is so well-
financed due to its access to petroleum revenue that potential rebels are unlikely to launch a war 
based on sheer resource asymmetry. The risk of civil war as related to natural resources peaks 
when primary commodity exports compose around 25% of GDP (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner 
2008). 
Several studies have drawn a connection between a state‟s per capita income and the 
likelihood of a civil war occurring [Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2008]. Fearon 
and Laitin‟s 2003 study found that in 1985 dollars, $1,000 less in per capita income is associated 
with 41% greater annual odds of civil war onset, while a country in the bottom decile of income 
has an 18% chance of a civil war outbreak over a decade, compared to an 11% chance for a 
country at the median income and a 1% chance for a country at the ninetieth percentile (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003).  Collier and Hoeffler conclude that that conflict-free states included in their 
2008 study “are characterized by a per capita income that is more than five times higher than in 
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countries in which wars broke out” (Collier and Hoeffller 2008). The 2003 study by Fearon and 
Laitin also finds that ethnic and religious polarization represent statistically significant effects 
that increase rates of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Collier and Hoeffler‟s 2004 paper, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” expands upon 
and refines the ideas proposed in their initial 1998 article.  This paper utilizes an econometric 
model of civil wars between 1960-1999 to elucidate the relationship between motive and 
opportunity in the outbreak of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Unlike previous studies 
which focus on the “opportunity” to rebel groups that arises from grievances within a civilian 
population, Collier and Hoeffler‟s model emphasizes “atypical opportunities” arising from the 
availability of revenue streams for rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  As Keen writes, 
“war combines both the breakdown of order and the use of violence, with the emergence of an 
alternative system of profit, power, and even protection” (Keen 2000). 
While Collier and Hoeffler find little explanatory power attached to grievance and the 
outbreak of civil war, their model focusing on financial opportunities for rebellion (through 
extortion, exploitation of natural resources, donations from diasporas, and subventions from 
hostile government) performs quite well across dozens of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
As Collier and Hoeffler comment, they attribute the strength of the connection between the 
availability of financing and the incidence of civil conflict to the fact that such opportunities 
“[make] rebellion feasible and perhaps even attractive” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).   
Other authors focus on factors affecting the duration of civil wars. James Fearon, in his 
2004 article, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others,” finds that five 
factors share statistically strong relationships with civil war duration. Among these five factors, 
Fearon concludes that conflicts in which a rebel group enjoys access to funding from contraband, 
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whether it be coca, opium, or diamonds, tend to be quite long-lived compared to the average 
duration of civil conflict in his study (Fearon 2004).  The estimated median and mean civil war 
durations for the 17 cases coded into Fearon‟s model involving major rebel group funding from 
contraband are 28.1 and 48.2, respectively, as compared to 6.0 and 8.8 for the rest (Fearon 2004).  
The recent literature related to the occurrence of civil war includes substantial evidence 
for a correlative, if not causative, relationship between high-value lootable resources and civil of 
conflict. The below table demonstrates this trend, with the incidence of civil war among 
producers of Opium and Coca and Alluvial Diamonds more than double the incidence among 
nonproducers: 
 
Furthermore, evidence points to the notion that the higher-value the lootable resource, the more 
its presence correlates with civil conflict. A comparison between the above and below tables 
demonstrates that the rate of civil war among substantial producers of opium and coca is almost 
fifty percent higher compared to the rate among primary source (large) producers of the lower 
value cannabis, while the average rate of civil war among all countries stands at almost double 
the rate among secondary source (lesser) producing countries.  
Civil War Rates, 1990-2000 by Diamond and Drug Production (Ross 2003, 53) 
 
 
Civil War Rates, 1990-2000 by Cannabis Production (Ross 2003, 54) 
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Michael Ross, in his 2003 paper, “Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: How Do Natural Resources 
Vary in their Impact on Civil War?” argues that the impact of natural resources on a civil war‟s 
duration or onset depends on whether or not the resource is “lootable” – that is, whether it can be 
easily appropriated by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers (Ross 2003).  Ross finds 
empirical evidence that the presence or availability of lootable resource, including diamonds and 
drugs, increases the likelihood and duration of non-separatist civil conflict, while “unlootable” 
resources, which require large capital investment for profitable extraction, tend to produce 
separatist conflicts (Ross 2003).   The 9 countries (4.7%) out of 190 total countries considered 
primary source producers of opium or coca, accounted for 15 of the 109 intrastate conflicts 
(13.7%) recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) for the period 1990-2003 
(Cornell 2005). Only Bolivia and Thailand did not experience large scale civil conflict among 
the nine drug producing states (Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Laos, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Peru and Thailand) (Cornell 2005).  
As evident in the table on the next page, of all the civil wars involving lootable resources 
between 1990 and 2000 included in Ross‟ study, only the conflict in Burma can be classified as 
separatist in nature (Ross 2003). In addition to their lootability, drugs are a resource with very 
low obstructability; that is, drugs can be transported with ease when compared to obstructable 
resources like oil or timber which rely on complex transport networks to be brought to market 
(Ross 2003).  Thus, the differences that matter among resources for determining rates of civil 
war are between lootable versus unlootable resources and obstructable versus unobstructable 
resources, instead of oil versus timber or diamonds versus drugs.  
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Ross‟s 2003 study, despite its limitation to the 1990-2000 period, concludes that while no 
obvious difference in the civil war rates among states dependent on the four general categories of 
natural resources as defined by the World Bank (oil, gas, and other fuel-based minerals; nonfuel 
minerals, excluding gemstones; food-based agricultural exports; and nonfood agricultural 
exports, including timber but excluding illegal drugs), there does exist a strong association 
between civil war and the production of both alluvial diamonds and high-value drugs like coca 
and opium (Ross 2003).  Rebel group access to revenue from narcotics prolongs but does not 
increase the likelihood of a civil conflict (Ross 2004). In a later 2004 study, Collier and Hoeffler 
also conclude that primary commodity exports have a “highly significant” effect upon conflict 
risk, and that oil exports have roughly the same effect on conflict risk as other commodities 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
Lootability and Separatism (Ross 2003) 
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A 2004 examination of 14 recent econometric studies and several qualitative studies 
examining the relationship between civil war and natural resources by Michael Ross confirms 
and refines many of the hypotheses given in his 2003 paper, contextualizing them within the 
current literature.  Four overarching regularities are found in the literature: first, that oil increases 
the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; second, „lootable‟ commodities like 
gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen 
existing conflicts; third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and 
civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities – a category that includes 
both oil and agricultural goods – and the onset of civil war remains broadly weak  but strong 
when primary commodities compose around 25% of GDP, as Collier and Hoeffler conclude 
(Ross 2004).   
On the whole, there are seven key takeaways from the above discussion of the recent literature 
on the occurrence of civil war, listed below:  
1) Empirical data indicates a statistical correlation between the presence of lootable 
resources and non-separatist conflicts.  
2) Evidence points to the notion that the higher-value the lootable resource (such as coca 
and opium versus marijuana), the more its presence correlates with civil conflict.  
3) Lootable resources like gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, 
but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts 
4) The effect of natural resources is non-monotonic in its relationship to the likelihood of 
civil conflict: the presence of natural resources increases the risk of war but only up to a 
certain threshold, peaking when primary commodity exports reach about 25% of GDP. 
5) Per capita income shares a strong correlation with the likelihood of civil war regardless of 
a state‟s ethnic composition. States in the lowest income quartile have an eighteen-fold 
higher chance of a civil war occurring than those states in the highest income quartile. 
Drugs and Revolution 
 Spitzer | 14 
 
6) Opportunities for financial exploitation tend to correlate with the occurrence of civil war, 
whether through extortion, exploitation of natural resources, donations from diasporas, 
subventions from hostile government, et cetera. 
7) Conflicts in which a rebel group enjoys access to funding from contraband, whether it be 
coca, opium, or diamonds, tend to last longer compared to the average duration of civil 
conflict. 
Theoretical Framework 
Why does the presence of lootable resources zone tend to produce non-separatist 
conflicts? With this central question in mind, others develop: Do rebel groups transform from 
separatist to non-separatist over time? Do non-separatist goals always indicate a rebel group‟s 
desire to take over a state‟s central government in its entirety? What circumstances contribute to 
rebel group involvement in the drug trade in the first place? A number of hypotheses based on 
the above literature review offer potential answers to these vital questions.   
“Where rebellion is materially feasible it will occur,” assert Collier and Hoeffeler in their 
“feasibility hypothesis” (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner 2008).  This idea arise in part from the work 
of Jack Hirshleifer, whose 2001 book, “The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of 
Conflict Theory,” theorizes that “no profitable opportunity for violence will go unused” (the 
“Machiavelli Theory”) (Hirshleifer 2001).  The level of funding required for a full-scale 
rebellion, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner argue, makes it very difficult to regard the decision to 
launch an armed conflict as a simple escalation of political protest (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner 
2008).  In other words, financial considerations underlie a rebel group‟s formation to a much 
greater extent than the decision to form a political party, which lacks military capabilities. Thus, 
based on the level of state capacity in most countries, rebellion remains an unfeasible option 
because of the state‟s asymmetric access to financial resources and the use of those resources to 
support a military (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner 2008).  Furthermore, as a result of the 
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interdependent relationship between financial resources and military power, rebellions must 
surpass a certain threshold of funding that allows them to build and maintain a military wing 
capable of mounting even a minimal campaign against the state government (Collier, Hoeffler, 
Rohner 2008).  
As a corollary to Hirshleifer‟s “Machiavelli Theory,” Grossman argues that the 
profitability incentive for rebellion only holds true if upon victory, the rebel group can provide 
its members with material rewards (Collier and Hoeffler 1998).  The level of potential 
profitability from a government takeover can be measured by calculating the potential taxable 
base of a country; yet because a larger taxable base tends to increase government power over 
rebel groups, the potential reward and costs of war share a direct relationship, resulting in an 
ambiguous net effect on the likelihood of civil war (Grossman 1995).  Collier and Hoeffler 
suggest that in secessionist conflicts, the taxable base of the pre-secession state does not figure 
into rebel group calculations of future rewards; instead, these types of conflicts may be 
motivated by access to untapped natural resources, or better representation of a minority group in 
government (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). For rebel groups thinking about entering the drug trade, 
Grossman‟s theory demonstrates the allure of narcotics revenue as a means to reap the rewards 
of rebellion immediately instead of at the resolution of a conflict.   Collier and Hoeffler‟s 
feasibility hypothesis and Grossman‟s theory of profitable incentive provide a valuable 
background for understanding the following hypotheses.   
The first potential hypothesis, against which all others must ultimately be measured, is 
the “null hypothesis.” That is, that despite demonstrated statistical correlation, no causative 
relationship exists between the exploitation of lootable resources and non-separatist conflict. 
With this null hypothesis in mind as a burden of proof, the following hypotheses outline a 
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theoretical framework to explain the statistical tendency of rebel groups funded by drugs and 
other lootable contraband to possess non-separatist goals. 
 Hypothesis 1: Non-separatist rebel groups do not organize around lootable resource 
exploitation; instead, over the course of a conflict, they create war economies using lootable 
resources because such resources produce widespread economic benefits for the population 
of the region where they are produced (Ross 2003).  
Separatist conflicts often organize, even if nominally, around gaining access to natural 
resources. Grievances regarding a state‟s misallocation of revenue generated by oil, coal, or 
copper extraction in a particular region, for example, would be much more likely to produce a 
separatist conflict from the outset because these resources cannot be exploited to benefit a 
population without large capital investments and access to legal international markets. While 
non-separatist rebel groups may adopt drugs as a source of revenue during a conflict, separatist 
groups may commence a conflict believing a separate state provides the only avenue to the 
financial benefits of a given natural resource.   This idea relates to another hypothesis proposed 
by Ross, that the relationship between non-separatist conflicts and the lootability of resources 
within a country arises from the fact that lootable resources tend to require little skill for 
extraction and thus benefit local populations in contrast to unlootable resources which require 
skilled labor and capital intensive processes that tend to benefit governments over locals, and 
hence may produce grievances about the distribution of resource wealth (Ross 2004). Rebel 
groups may also establish war economies dependent on the extraction of illegal lootable 
resources and conflict perpetuation in order to build a base of support through mutual economic 
interests.  
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 Hypothesis 2: State weakness, related to both capacity and territorial control, causes rebel 
groups to believe they have a decent chance of taking over the entire state. Second, state 
weakness provides rebel groups an operating base beyond the states control where lootable 
resources can be produced. 
The conclusion of numerous studies indicating a strong correlation between per capita 
income and the likelihood of civil war points to another hypothesis for the non-separatist nature 
of civil conflicts involving lootable resources: state weakness [Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004, 2008].  Fearon and Laitin interpret income levels as a proxy for the capacity 
of a state‟s government, and thus a government‟s ability to discourage rebellion (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003).  Rebel groups in a low per capital GDP environment may determine that the state 
lacks capacity to such a degree that they have a decent chance of taking over the entire entity. 
The groups then begin to exploit lootable resources, such as illegal narcotics, that provide a cash 
flow advantage compared to the state government because of the revenue stream‟s illegality.  
Over time, this non-separatist posture lends itself either to state takeover, or to a  type of 
accommodationist equilibrium, or “chronic insurgency” described in hypothesis  four. 
 Hypothesis 3: The prospect of international sanctions against a state government involved in 
the drug trade imparts disproportionate financial benefits on rebel groups engaged in drug 
trafficking versus states, giving them operational independence to seek a takeover of the 
central government. 
The fact that rebel groups operate outside of the international system gives them an 
advantage over state government in their access to funding from illegal natural resources, 
especially when a state government lacks revenue from a substantial taxable base or the 
extraction of natural resources. The financial benefits of the drug trade may prove so significant 
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that they provide a rebel group the chance to build its operation capacity to the point its leaders 
believe in the potential for the group to take over the state‟s central government. In rare cases, 
governments endure international sanctions in order to participate in the drug trade, which 
lessens or removes the financial benefits imparted upon rebel groups who derive funding from 
illegal natural resources. The financial asymmetry produced by access to revenue from illegal 
drug trafficking combined with the international sanctions regime offers one explanation for the 
tendency of rebel groups who derive funding from narcotics to have non-separatist goals.   
 Hypothesis 4: The potential for revenue from the drug trade incentivizes rebel groups to 
maintain a non-separatist posture in the sense that they seek the perpetuation of conflict in 
order to maximize their profit. 
 Indeed, the potential for international sanctions levied upon governments that encourage 
or allow the production of illegal natural resources like coca, cannabis, and opium tends to deter 
states from involving themselves in the drug trade (Ross 2003). The opportunities for profit 
offered by rebel group participation in the drug trade incentivizes rebel groups to maintain a 
nominal non-separatist posture in the most literal sense – they desire the simple perpetuation of 
conflict because it also means the preservation of their livelihood.  This hypothesis results in this 
paper‟s utilization of a broad definition of non-separatist groups, including both those groups 
whose goal  it is to take over a state‟s central government, as well as groups whose primary goal 
it is to perpetuate conflict in order to maximize profits, or otherwise.  Some scholars call this 
type of profit-driven conflict perpetuation “chronic insurgency,” or a civil conflict which lasts for 
years or even decades yet neither topples a regime nor suffers complete defeat by the state (Kay 
1999).   
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 Hypothesis 5: The presence of contraband exacerbates principal-agent problems in rebel 
groups by allowing soldiers the opportunity to accumulate personal wealth. Such personal 
predation creates discipline problems at the expense of a rebel group’s central organization, 
making peace agreements difficult to enforce because financial opportunities provided by 
conflict are more attractive to combatants than peace (Ross 2004).   
The notion that “profitable opportunities” for violence will not go untapped is of 
particular relevance to a discussion of civil conflicts funded by drug trafficking, as revenue from 
the drug trade can give rebel groups a sense of operational autonomy independent of their 
success on the proverbial battlefield. At the same time, this operational autonomy creates internal 
problems within rebel groups that may contribute to the non-separatist nature and longevity of 
civil conflict‟s involving illegal drugs. 
The discipline problems created by the spread of lootable resource wealth across a rebel 
organization may cause a group to fall into a default non-separatist posture, more comparable to 
the position of a warlord versus that of a true political organization. The phenomenon of “armed 
warlordism” may arise in a civil conflict zone, whereby members of a rebel group exercise de 
facto sovereignty over a geographic area in order to secure commercial instead of political or 
secessionist interests (Le Billon 2001).  The degeneration of a conflict into such “armed 
warlordism” or “chronic insurgency” often follows a distinct de-escalation of violence as 
opposing factions reach a sort of accommodation (that sometimes provides financial benefits to 
the state military and rebel group alike), with financial self-interest motivating soldiers, 
commanders, and political leadership to sustain profitable conflicts (Le Billon 2001).  This 
sequence of events creates a “no-armed conflict-nor-peace” stalemate that tends to reduce the 
overall level of violence while extending the “stable conflict” in a manner that prevents 
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successful political and economic reforms and conflict resolution (Le Billon 2001). On the 
whole, drug production provides factions within a rebel group monetary support to sustain 
conflict without the help of the central organization, while providing them financial incentives to 
do so.  Such a situation causes rebel groups to become ever more decentralized in nature, with 
the central leadership losing its ability to impose battle directives, let alone the terms of a conflict 
settlement, upon its members. Rebel groups remain nominally non-separatist, but only in the 
sense that they do not intend to separate from the state; instead, they may simply desire the 
continuation of profitable conflict.  As Michael Ross writes, “wartime resource exploitation 
[may] become so profitable for rebels that they prefer war to peace” (Ross 2003). Drug money 
also increases the autonomy of rebel organizations – that is, their ability to withstand substantial 
government counterinsurgency efforts and to maintain a stable organization independent of their 
popularity among the civilian population or their battlefield performance.  
Research Design and Case Selection 
If rebel groups do not initiate conflict based on expected future funding from narcotics, 
then rebel leadership must at some point make an organizational decision to pursue such funding. 
Why do rebel groups choose to enter the illegal narcotics industry? More importantly, how does 
utilization of narcotic-related revenue change rebel group strategies, goals, and tactics? This 
paper explores these questions with a particular focus on the reason civil conflicts that involve 
funding from lootable resources – especially illegal narcotics – tend to be non-separatist in 
nature.  It will attempt to answer the question of what mechanisms internal and external to rebel 
groups produce non-separatist goals, and whether these goals evolve as a rebel group comes to 
rely on narcotic-related revenue to sustain its operations.   
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The analysis will be completed through case studies of civil conflicts in three states: 
Colombia, Indonesia, and Peru. The Colombian and Peruvian cases, both non-separatist in 
nature, offer examples of longstanding conflicts with high levels of rebel group funding derived 
from the cultivation of illegal drugs. Neither the FARC in Colombia nor the Shining Path in Peru 
launched their rebellions with drug-related revenue; both began to utilize it over time, attempting 
to relate coca cultivation activities to their underlying historical-ideological message of peasant 
self-defense (Lujala 2009). The Shining Path presents an excellent dual case, as the national 
rebel organization derived little revenue from the drug trade despite the reliance of one of its 
regional offshoots in the Huallaga Valley on narcotic-related revenue. The Free Aceh 
Movement/Indonesia case offers the opportunity to prove the negative validity of this paper‟s 
theoretical framework in a case that involves a separatist group and lacks the presence of 
lootable resources.   
The reasons for the selection of these three cases for analysis stem from the availability 
of sources as well as the degree to which they represent the broader universe of cases available 
for study. A limited number of conflicts involve substantial amounts of narcotics-related revenue 
to the point that a rebel group relies on such funding to sustain its operations. Although the 
conclusions of this paper apply beyond this narrow group of cases where drug funding represents 
a central component of armed conflict, such cases present the best opportunity to isolate the 
specific effects of the drug trade on rebel group goals. The three other major cases of civil 
conflict involving substantial narcotics-related revenue, Burma, Mexico, and Afghanistan all 
bear certain research problems that make their applicability to the theoretical framework of this 
paper quite difficult. Both Mexico and Afghanistan remain active conflict zones; Mexican drug 
gangs do not appear to hold overt political goals of state takeover, while the Afghanistan 
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situation is complicated by US intervention. Burmese rebel groups have wavered between 
separatist and non-separatist goals while their reliance on drug revenue does not approach that of 
the FARC or Shining Path in the Huallaga Valley. The isolation of Burma and the newness of 
Mexican civil conflict cause these cases to suffer from a relative dearth of information compared 
to the three cases selected for analysis.  
The FARC represents the archetypal rebel group involved in the drug trade; the centrality 
of this case to the civil war literature makes a discussion of it all but necessary to advance an 
argument in this field. Second, the abundance of academic and journalistic sources related to the 
FARC increase its applicability to this paper‟s theoretical framework.  The negative validity 
provided by the Free Aceh Movement/Indonesia case demonstrates, albeit only within one case, 
that a lack of narcotics revenue correlates with separatist (instead of non-separatist) goals. In 
other words, while civil conflicts involving narcotics funding produce non-separatist rebel 
groups (FARC and Shining Path), the Aceh conflict, which lacks the independent variable of 
drug funding, also fails to produce the dependent variable of non-separatist goals. The third and 
final case, the Shining Path in Peru, offers an additional measure of external validity for the 
theoretical framework, albeit to a lesser degree than the FARC. Shining Path as a national 
organization relied on narcotics funding to a much lesser degree than FARC, but its regional 
offshoot in the Huallaga Valley, which outlasted the national organization by at least two 
decades, depended upon coca cultivation to sustain its operations. Although this case does not 
occupy as central a role in supporting this paper‟s theoretical framework, it offers the chance to 
conduct an internal comparison of the same rebel group with and without access to substantial 
drug funding. 
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This paper defines civil war according to three widely recognized metrics: first, a civil 
war must result in a minimum of 1,000 battle related deaths over its duration (Fearon 2004). 
Second, to qualify as a civil war the stronger forces must sustain at least 5% of the number of 
fatalities suffered by the weaker forces. This metric helps to differentiate massacres or other 
singular occurrences of violence from genuine ongoing civil wars (Singer and Small 1982).  
Illegal drugs or substances are defined according to those featured in schedules I, II, III, and IV 
of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, and its predecessors, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  
Note that  this paper utilizes a broad definition of non-separatist groups, including both 
those groups whose goal  it is to take over a state‟s central government, as well as groups whose 
primary goal it is to perpetuate conflict in order to maximize profits, or otherwise.   
II. The FARC in Colombia 
Historical Introduction: Emergence of the FARC 
The personal story of Pedro Antonio Marín Marín, better known by his nom de guerre, 
Manuel Marulanda “Sureshot” Velez, very much parallels that of the Colombian rebel group 
FARC, or Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias  de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia)  which he would one day lead.  From his peasant upbringing to his participation in 
Colombia‟s 1948 civil war known as La Violencia, to his leadership of the Marquetalia 
„independent republic‟,  the personal story of „Commandante Velez‟ intertwines  inextricably 
with the political history of Colombia and the growth of its largest rebel group which he led for 
60 years: the FARC.   
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Unlike most of its Latin American neighbors, Colombia has a long history of civilian rule 
with regular free elections and only a few limited episodes of formal military control 
(Livingstone 2004).  Since the beginning of the Colombian Republic in 1826, the ruling elites 
have divided into two groups: the Liberal and Conservative Parties (Livingstone 2004). As 
journalist Grace Livingstone writes, “traditional Latin American historiography has portrayed 
Conservatives as great landowners and military leaders, while Liberals were thought to be 
merchants or professionals” (Livingstone 2004).  Historian David Bushnell echoes this 
traditional historiography, describing the Liberal-Conservative dichotomy as one of tienda 
(store) and hacienda (farm), with the Liberals representing the commercial and professional 
interests and the Conservatives representing the party of the large landowners and the Catholic 
Church (Ruiz 2001).  
The two party system and its oligarchical nature have created certain political and 
economic conditions that share a direct relationship with the history and endurance of civil 
conflict in Colombia. As a result of the narrow oligarchy that controlled both parties throughout 
most of their history, the government tended to funnel its resources to major metropolitan areas, 
with rural regions receiving little support or investment from the central government (Ruiz 
2001).   This system created a power structure that to this day tends to ignore the grinding 
poverty suffered by a large segment of rural Colombia, excluding all but the elite members of the 
two ruling parties from the political process.  As a study by economists R. Albert Berry and 
Miguel Urrutia revealed in 1976, the top 3 percent of the landed elite own 71.3 percent of the 
arable land, while 57 percent of the poorest farmers subsist on 2.8 percent (Ruiz 2001). The 
study concluded that “inequality was at a high absolute level in Colombia, compared to other 
countries” (Ruiz 2001).  
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 The degree of wealth and power vested in the state infrastructure, combined with the 
patron-client nature of political relations within Colombia led to titanic conflict in 1899, after a 
contested election led to the Conservative Party‟s takeover of government, a process which 
touched off a civil war (Ruiz 2001). The outbreak of violence in 1899 marked the beginning of 
the War of One Thousand Days, the first full-scale lasting armed conflagration caused by the 
social animosity and competition between the Conservative and Liberal Parties (Ruiz 2001). This 
war which lasted three years and came at a cost of 100,000 lives, ended after exhaustion led to 
the rise of moderate elements in both parties and a subsequent  peace treaty signed by the Liberal 
Party and Conservative government (Ruiz 2001).While the Thousand Days War ended in 1902, 
discontent simmered in Colombia‟s countryside.  Widespread land disputes related to urban-to-
rural migration, tension in tenant-landowner relationships, and strikes by banana and oil workers 
created a tenuous peace in rural Colombia after 1902 (Ruiz 2001).  Indeed, it was during this 
period after the 1899-1903 war that large-scale violence in the countryside became de rigueur in 
Colombia, as did the adoption of an “out of sight, out of mind” attitude that continues to define 
the attitude of urbanites toward the rural poor (Ruiz 2001).  
 The continued tension in the countryside led to a situation which galvanized millions of 
Colombians behind Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a young Colombian politician and member of the 
Liberal Party from a poor neighborhood in Bogota who espoused populist policies involving land 
reform and improved worker‟s right (Ruiz 2001).  On April 9, 1948, in the tense political climate 
of a new Conservative government after 16 years of Liberal Party rule, a man murdered Jorge 
Gaitan on a Bogota sidewalk (Ruiz 2001).  The shock of the rising political star‟s death, the 
immoderate transition to Conservative power, and the simmering resentment among the rural 
poor instigated a devastating civil war in Colombia, known only by the epithet La Violencia 
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(“the violence”).  The chaos and popular despondency following Gaitan‟s death triggered the 
Bogotazo riot, which historians often refer to as the greatest riot in modern history, an event 
whose destructive power was matched only by the civil war it touched off (Ruiz 2001). 
 The massive riot brought about by Gaitan‟s sudden death prompted thousands of his 
supporters, so-called “Gaitanistas,” to head for the hills and jungles of Colombia to fight the 
Conservatives (Ruiz 2001). Between 1948 and 1953, 200,000 Colombians lost their lives in this 
“bi-partisan” war of unspeakable carnage (Livingstone 2004). The war represented more than a 
violent manifestation of inter-party animosity; La Violencia displayed all the markers of a 
spontaneous social uprising, one in which urbanites killed each other, peasants killed peasants, 
landlords killed peasants, and peasants killed landlords, sometimes but not always with 
revolutionary intent (Livingstone 2004). Democratic government would not return to Colombia 
until a series of military coups led to the creation of the National Front government, a power-
sharing arrangement between the Liberal and Conservative Parties (Ruiz 2001).  
 The period of La Violencia marked a critical time in the life of Manuel Marulanda 
“Sureshot” Velez, FARC‟s future supreme commandante (Ruiz 2001). The brutal policies 
implemented by the Conservative government throughout La Violencia, as well as a peace-
driven crackdown on dissent after the end of armed conflict, prompted the creation of guerilla 
movements in rural Colombia, groups which became the locus of resistance to the Conservative 
government for millions of Gaitanistas (Ruiz 2001). Millions of rural people to viewed guerilla 
groups as a credible opposition to crooked government administrations (Ruiz 2001).  Manuel 
“Sureshot” Marulanda Velez renewed his fight with the government after the formation of the 
National Front, viewing it as an “invitation only” political system that excluded Colombia‟s 
poorest rural citizens (Ruiz 2001).  The National Front, while dampering the effect of the 
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traditional Liberal-Conservative party rivalry, created a ruling class that represented a further 
consolidation of the already narrow pre-war oligarchy (Ruiz 2001).  
 The Communist takeover of the Cuban government heightened anxiety within the 
National Front government regarding the prospect of a communism-fueled popular uprising 
(Ruiz 2001).  In this context Colombian government leaders, encouraged by American military 
advisors, chose to take action against a small “resistance community” of about 100 families in 
southern Colombia, which the government declared an “independent republic” (Livingstone 
2004).  While most groups put down their arms after a government offer of amnesty in 1953, 
some continued living as bandit in the countryside, organizing for protection or revenge, 
sometimes with a broader political vision (Livingstone 2004). Communist and Liberal Party 
guerilla-militias formed in southern Colombia to protect villagers against the 
counterrevolutionary onslaught of 1950-53, groups which eventually transformed into so-called 
“resistance communities” (Livingstone 2004).  In 1955, the Colombian military launched a 
campaign against these communities, an action which prompted the migration of these villagers 
and militias to the southern provinces of Tolima, Meta, and Caqueta (Livingstone 2004).  On the 
morning of June 14, 1964, the Colombian military launched a large and devastating 
bombardment and later ground invasion of one of the southern “independent republics” known 
as Marquetalia (Ruiz 2001).  
Manuel Marulanda “Sureshot” Velez led the 50 guerilla fighters tasked with defending 
Marquetalia to a miraculous escape from the town through a secret jungle route, despite 
encirclement by Colombian armed forces (Ruiz 2001). Five months later, the group of 50 held 
the landmark conference in the town of  Riochiquito where Sureshot and his lieutenants defined 
the future military-political role of the FARC (Ruiz 2001). As historian Arturo Alape writes, 
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“with Operation Marquetalia, the directing class of the country created the FARC movement in 
Colombia” (Ruiz 2001).  The broad exclusion of Colombia‟s rural underclass from the new 
coalition government system, which perpetuated the oligarchy that had ruled the country since its 
founding in 1826, drove Sureshot and his followers to arms.  Without question, as Grace 
Livingstone comments, the “long history of armed peasant struggle that preceded the formation 
of the FARC explains the deep-rooted support it has in some rural communities and why it has 
managed to survive so long” (Livingstone 2004). 
 For the next two decades, the FARC “festered as a marginal nuisance” in the 
Colombian countryside (Marks 2002). Despite periodic Colombian government crackdowns, 
FARC operated without substantial state intervention throughout the 1960s and 70s (Rabasa and 
Chalk 2001).  Before 1980, the FARC‟s primary objectives, beyond its strategic goals of agrarian 
reform, included the capture of military equipment, the procurement of food, the capturing of 
hostages for ransom, and settling scores with informers (Rabasa and Chalk 2001).  The 
geography of Colombia combined with the historic pattern of state control over territory in 
Colombia combined to impel the government‟s somewhat detached attitude during this early 
period of FARC‟s existence.  By the close of the 1970s, FARC could claim just under 2,000 
members (Marks 2002).  
 In 1982, the FARC leadership held its Seventh Conference in the Colombian town of 
Yacopi (Holmes et.al. 2007). The 1982 conference outlined an aggressive growth strategy for 
FARC that called for the opening of at least one front in each of Colombia‟s 33 departments and 
the buildup of a guerilla military of 28,000 individuals (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). This system 
would both provide FARC with much-needed revenue, as well as a dependable mass base of 
support in rural Colombia from which it could recruit and find safe haven (Marks 2002).  Despite 
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its decision to enter the narcotics trade, FARC faced immediate challenges from the dominant 
Cali and Medellin cartels. Pablo Escobar‟s Medellin Cartel in particular competed with the 
FARC for control of land, as the cartel began to buy up massive acreage in the Colombian 
hinterlands financed by the proceeds of its drug empire (DeAtley 2010). FARC gained broad 
loyalty among Colombia‟s coca-growing peasants by replacing drug traffickers strategies of 
harassment and intimidation with offers to set coca prices above the level set by narcotraffickers, 
(Cook 2011).  In addition, a pattern of urban to rural migration  in Colombia driven by economic 
hardship in cities  – known as the “coca rush” – provided a significant population of alienated 
individuals who made easy recruits for the FARC and the paramilitary groups (Cook 2011).  
The Colombian government‟s US-assisted crackdown on the Medellin and Cali cartels in 
the mid-1990s presented the FARC with new opportunities to profit from the “downstream” 
phases of the drug production chain (Livingstone 2004). But the formation of so-called “self-
defense forces,” or paramilitary groups with the support of the government and dozens of smaller 
cartels, challenged FARC‟s domination of the Colombian countryside (Cook 2011). The 
emergence of these paramilitary groups, which now exist under an umbrella organization known 
as the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), 
combined with FARC‟s increased operational capacity due to the financial and recruitment 
benefits of its deepening involvement in the drug trade, led to great intensification in the 
Colombian civil war (Cook 2011).  
By 1998, FARC enjoyed the ability to challenge battalion-size Colombian Army units 
(Maddaloni 2009). A secret US government report in 1998 assessed the Colombian government 
as “the most threatened in the area under the Southern Command‟s responsibility…” (Ruiz 
2001). The report further asserted the near parity in battle-ready manpower of FARC and the 
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Colombian armed forces (Ruiz 2001).  The administration of Colombian President Pastrana 
initiated failed peace negotiations with FARC by ceding the rebel group a safe zone composed of 
40% of Colombian territory (Cook 2011).  In response to this grave assessment of Colombian 
state weakness, the United States launched “Plan Colombia,” a comprehensive aid package 
designed to assist the Colombian government in its fight against drug traffickers, cultivators, and  
rebel groups (Saskiewicz 2005).  
Since its peak membership in 2002 at between 15 and 20,000 members, FARC has 
declined to about 8,000 active fighters as a result of Plan Colombia‟s implementation under 
former Colombian president Alvaro Uribe (Markey 2011).  After his election, President Uribe 
launched an aggressive program of “Democratic Security” to confront FARC and other armed 
groups  in the aftermath of the  Pastrana administration‟s failed peace efforts (Maddaloni 2009). 
Despite the popularity of the security crackdown among the Colombian population, President 
Uribe suffered from heavy criticism stemming from his denouncement of human rights groups, 
suspected military cover-ups of civilian deaths, and alleged ties to right-wing paramilitary groups 
(Vaunters and Smith 2006).  But combined with the robust military approach of the Uribe 
administration, the $2 billion of US military and economic aid to the Colombian government has 
proven remarkably effective in weakening FARC (Vaunters and Smith 2006).  At the same time, 
FARC remains a formidable, if weakened force, in parts of rural southern Colombia, with dozens 
of hostages held in jungle hideouts and continued large-scale participation in the drug trade 
(Markey 2011).  
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FARC Applied to the Theoretical Framework 
The below discussion will trace the more recent history of the FARC in the context of the 
five hypotheses outlined earlier in an attempt to explain the connection between non-separatist 
goals and funding from narcotics trafficking.  
 Hypothesis 1: Non-separatist rebel groups do not organize around lootable resource 
exploitation; instead, over the course of a conflict, they create war economies using lootable 
resources because such resources produce widespread economic benefits for the population 
of the region where they are produced (Ross 2003).  
As demonstrated in the previous section, the FARC rebellion did not organize around 
unequal distribution of windfalls from unlootable resources, or lootable resources for that matter. 
To the contrary, the FARC‟s origins lie in the history of political violence in Colombia, 
grievances about oligarchical control of the state government, land disputes, and the historic 
rural-urban divide.  In point of fact, FARC began as, and continues to operate to this day, as a 
rural-based peasant rights organization.  
At the group‟s landmark First Conference, held in late 1965, the rebel leadership laid out 
an agrarian reform plan that represented the first major statement of the group‟s strategic goals 
(Holmes et.al. 2007). These goals included structural change in the countryside, such as land 
reform, and expropriations; abolishment of peasant debt; a new system of peasant credit and 
assistance; agricultural price supports; and cultural and political autonomy for indigenous 
groups, among other demands (Holmes et.al. 2007).  Although FARC‟s strategic goals have 
evolved over time, the group‟s founding aims influenced the trajectory of the organization and 
the tactical means it employed to reach its revised objectives.   
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 FARC‟s chief spokesperson, Rodrigo Granda, commented in a March 2008 interview that 
“The FARC–EP existed long before…drug trafficking in Colombia…[this was a] by-product of 
the general situation in the country” (Granda 2007).  The rebel group continues to deny the 
centrality of narcotics to its organizational conception or current situation. While facts tend to 
belie Granda‟s latter point, history demonstrates the truth of the former: FARC did not organize 
around grievances related to the distribution of lootable resources. Indeed, the international 
market for illegal narcotics remained small during throughout the 1960s and 70s compared to its 
size in the 1980s and beyond (Thoumi 2002). Quite to the contrary, evidence points to FARC‟s 
gradual entry into the narcotics market as a calculated and deeply-deliberated decision 
inextricably linked to its non-separatist aspirations.  
 In 1982, the FARC leadership held its Seventh Conference in the Colombian town of 
Yacopi (Holmes et.al. 2007). The conference represents a seminal moment in the establishment 
of the FARC‟s formulation of a strategic plan designed to realize its long-term objectives 
(Holmes et.al. 2007). First, the 1982 conference outlined an aggressive growth strategy for 
FARC that called for the opening of at least one front in each of Colombia‟s 33 departments 
(Rabasa and Chalk 2001). At this meeting in 1982, FARC leaders declared their priority to create 
a revolutionary army of 28,000 individuals capable of defeating the state‟s security forces 
(Marks 2002). This army would allow the FARC to take advantage of the “inevitable” political 
collision in Colombia to be caused by “political contradictions” and “economic distortions” in 
Colombian society (Marks 2002). As Thomas Marks writes, the conference‟s final documents 
demonstrate that the “FARC has well-developed concepts for accomplishing its professed goal of 
seizing state-power” (Marks 2002). 
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 In the military realm, the FARC‟s plan relied on a classic Maoist rebel insurgency model, 
one which called for consolidation of power in the rural llanos region (which composes 95% of 
Colombian territory) and the eventual encirclement and takeover of major urban areas with the 
assistance of small urban cadres (Marks 2002).  The military strategy included a tripartite 
approach:  first, the establishment of a mass line, or critical rural infrastructure (Marks 2002); 
second, the construction of a united front around cities with a particular focus on control of 
strategic corridors (Rabasa and Chalk 2001); and third, large scale military action against 
Colombian military targets (Marks 2002).   
 Before it could implement its military goals and growth strategy, the FARC had to 
address two key logistical concerns: funding and recruitment. In the two decades prior to 1982, 
FARC encountered persistent difficulties in recruiting and retaining foot soldiers; although the 
group had undergone continuous growth between 1960 and 1982, FARC found it could not 
gather the critical mass of membership necessary for a broad-based movement capable of 
reshaping rural society (Marks 2002). The guerilla leaders found a sustainable solution to both of 
these logistical concerns through a decision that would redefine the nature of the conflict and 
allow FARC to undergo exponential growth in the domains of money and human capital: to 
exploit the expanding narcotics industry in rural Colombia (Marks 2002).  
 Although the later formal system of drug taxation had not yet been developed at the time 
of the Seventh Conference in 1982, FARC‟s leaders understood that the group‟s entry into the 
drug trade would operate as a classic protection racket: FARC would impose taxes upon coca 
cultivators and cocaine refiners in exchange for protection of their farmland and trafficking 
routes (Marks 2002). Furthermore, through this symbiotic relationship with farmers in the 
Colombian llano, FARC would create a dependable mass base of support from which it could 
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recruit and seek safe haven (Marks 2002).   Before 1982, FARC‟s leadership classified drug 
cultivation and trafficking as amoral “counter-revolutionary” activities (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). 
In fact several FARC commanders, such as one in Guaviare, had announced specific directives 
before 1982 prohibiting the cultivation of coca and marijuana (Rabasa and Chalk 2001).  But the 
growth of coca cultivation in the Colombian countryside under the auspices of ever more 
powerful criminal cartels – the Medellin and Cali cartels in particular – prompted fears within 
FARC that the loyalty of their social base could be at risk due to the economic dominance of 
coca cultivation in the countryside combined with the FARC‟s opposing attitude toward such 
activities (Rabasa and Chalk 2001).  Thus, the policy of taxing the drug industry and recruiting 
peasants in the “downstream” segment of the drug business evolved into a formal policy 
pronounced in the unpublished “Conclusions” of the FARC Seventh Conference (Rabasa and 
Chalk 2001).  The taxation system, known as the gramaje, taxed various steps in the narcotics 
production process at different rates according to the table below: 
Guerilla Taxes on Colombian Cocaine and Heroin Industry 1994-1995 
Activity Tax Amount 
Cultivation 10,000 pesos per hectare per month 
Processing 5,000 pesos per kilo produced 
Export from Trafficking Zone 20,000 to 30,000 pesos per kilo shipped 
Operation of laboratory Up to 12 million pesos per month 
Use of airstrip 10 million pesos per month 
Import chemicals into zone 1,000 pesos per liter 
Import gasoline into zone 1,000 pesos per 55-gallon drum 
From The Andean Cocaine Industry, Clawson and Lee, 1998, p. 179 
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Over the next two decades, FARC would expand its base of support by exploiting peasants 
hostility toward a US-financed coca eradication campaign and playing up class divisions 
between coca-growers and cocaine operators (Clawson and Lee 1998). 
Despite the economic and social factors impelling its involvement in the drug trade, 
FARC‟s 1982 decision to enter the narcotic business did encounter internal opposition from 
certain corners of the organization. In particular, FARC‟s political chief, Jacobo Arenas, 
advocated against direct involvement in the drug trade, fearing that the narcotics business would 
harm FARC„s political message  (Maddaloni 2009). Arenas‟ initial opposition continued 
throughout the 1980s, causing FARC to refrain from direct participation in the drug trafficking 
and cultivation and instead levy taxes on narcotic production activities within territories under its 
control (Maddaloni 2009).  In the propagandistic style expected from the political head of a 
Marxist organization, Arenas branded the “narco-guerilla” theory part of a CIA-led “world-wide 
campaign against the revolutionary movement, against democracy, against the social progress of 
peoples” (Clawson and Lee 1998).  The opposition of Arenas‟ political wing to FARC‟s 
involvement in the drug trade demonstrates the weightiness of the rebel group‟s 1982 decision to 
begin taxing narcotic cultivation and production. Even those such as Arenas opposed to FARC‟s 
direct participation in the drug trade recognized the tremendous opportunity for growth and 
revenue presented by the narcotics industry, as evidenced by their willingness to levy taxes on 
narcotics production. The emergence of a group consensus in favor of involvement in the drug 
trade, either through taxation or direct participation, demonstrates not only the inextricable link 
in the eyes of FARC‟s leadership between narcotics revenue and the group‟s growth strategy, but 
also the degree to which FARC strategists viewed such funding as essential to their pursuit of 
government takeover.  
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The events of the early 1990s offer further evidence of the influence of Jacobo Arenas 
and FARC‟s political wing on group‟s level of involvement in the narcotics business. After 
Arenas‟ death in 1990 and the collapse three years later of the Medellin Cartel, FARC deepened 
its role in the downstream processes of the narcotics business, supplanting itself  into the 
middleman position between coca farmers and the hydrochloride cocaine processing labs 
operated by cartel bosses (Cilluffo 2000).  This deeper level of involvement in the higher-margin 
downstream processes provided FARC with a revenue boom in the mid and late 1990s which 
allowed the group to expand its military capabilities and further its non-separatist goals by 
gaining control of up to 40 percent of Colombia‟s territory (Cilluffo 2000).   
FARC‟s conscious decision to join in the drug trade cannot be separated from the group‟s 
long-term goals, as outlined in its decisive 1982 “Strategic Plan.” The narcotics business 
transformed into the guiding element of FARC‟s organizational plan; it stands at the center of the 
guerilla group‟s recruitment strategy, its strategy for territorial control, its financial viability, and 
most critically, FARC‟s ability to carry out its ultimate goal of state-takeover in Colombia. The 
opportunity to align its own economic interests with that of the population in its rural base 
impelled FARC into the drug business, and quieted even the most ardent internal opponents to 
the group‟s 1982 decision.  
The FARC leadership, by making simultaneous policy pronouncements at its Seventh 
Conference in May 1982 regarding its objective to build a revolutionary army capable of 
defeating the Colombian security forces and its intention to enter the narcotics trade, created an 
inextricable link between the drug trade and its fundamental organizational goals.  The drug 
business would help the FARC obtain resources to upgrade their weapons and communication 
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systems, while recruitment among the coca-growing population only deepened the group‟s 
involvement in the narcotics trade (Spencer 2001).  
 All of this evidence demonstrates that FARC‟s leadership viewed narcotics-related 
revenue as a means to their stated end of government takeover in Colombia.  The rebel group 
decided in 1982 to integrate its grievances regarding land reform and the urban-rural divide with 
an economic and recruitment strategy based upon taxation of (and later participation in) the drug 
industry.  FARC leader Sureshot Velez and his disciples organized the rebel group around 
political principles related to rural and Marxist revolution; as FARC spokesman Granda 
commented, revenue derived from drug trafficking represents a “by-product of the general 
situation in the country,” lending strong evidence to the validity of hypothesis one.  
 Hypothesis 2: State weakness, related to both capacity and  territorial control, causes rebel 
groups to believe they have a decent chance of taking over the entire state. Second, state 
weakness provides rebel groups an operating base beyond the states control where lootable 
resources can be produced. 
As US military analyst Thomas Marks writes, the FARC “festered as a marginal nuisance for 
nearly 2 decades” after the group‟s establishment (Marks 3). Despite periodic Colombian 
government crackdowns, such as the 1964 bombardment of Marquetalia, rural guerilla groups in 
Colombia, of which FARC was only one, operated without substantial state intervention 
throughout the 1960s and 70s (Rabasa and Chalk 2001).  The geography of Colombia combined 
with the state‟s historic weak control over its territory impelled the government‟s detached 
attitude during this early period of FARC‟s existence.  
Colombia had long been divided into two geographic areas (Marks 2002). The first 
encompasses about one-third of the state‟s territory, inducing mostly high country that lies west 
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of the Cordillera Oriental and is home to 95 percent of the Colombian population (Marks 2002). 
Although the second area east of the Andes mountain range (known as the llanos) comprises 
two-thirds of Colombia‟s territory, only 5 percent of the population resides within this area of 
vast plains, jungle, and savannah (Marks 2002). The stark geographic and population divisions 
within Colombia indicate the weakness of Colombia‟s state in exerting control over vast areas of 
its territory. Not only did the state lack control in the llanos region, but it tended to have little 
interest in addressing this lack of control. Before 1980 FARC controlled a negligible if any 
portion of the llanos region; however, the state‟s lack of interest in asserting control over its vast 
territorial domains reveals the historic response of governments in Bogota to the state‟s 
weakness:  conciliation, negotiation, and if possible willful ignorance of threats to its power 
(Rabasa and Chalk 2001). The small size of the FARC in the 1960s and 70s, the fragility of the 
new National Front government in Bogota, and the historic trend of a lacking state presence in 
the llanos region combined to prevent a substantial escalation of the civil conflict during this 
early period. 
 State weakness in the llanos region continued to sustain FARC into the 1980s and 1990s. 
As Thomas Marks writes, FARC “did not become a serious factor due to mobilization of an 
alienated mass base. Rather it became a serious factor due to the power which came from drugs 
grown by a marginalized population…[rural peasants] became [major players] because of their 
role as the base upon which drug cultivation and thus insurgent finances was built” (Marks 
2002). Without any doubt, as the FARC‟s involvement in the narcotics trade deepened in a 
manner consistent with its strategic plan laid out in 1982, the group‟s financial, recruitment, and 
military successes began to mount (Marks 2002). By 2002, FARC enjoyed the membership of 
15-20,000 individuals stationed across 60 fronts and mobile companies, a level of manpower and 
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geographic dispersement which began to approximate its goals set out in 1982 (Marks 2002). 
Furthermore, coca cultivation expanded almost in step with FARC‟s increased operational size 
and capabilities.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the number of hectares in Colombia 
dedicated to growing the coca leaf expanded by 187 percent from 42,400 hectares in 1989 to 
122,000 hectares in 2000, with about 300,000 Colombians dependent on this cultivation for their 
livelihoods by the end of this period (Livingstone 2004).   
The financial windfall from the taxation of and direct involvement in drug production 
combined with the elimination of mega-cartel rivals led to substantial gains in the FARC‟s 
quality of force; the rebel group purchased new weapons (often smuggled through the same 
channels used for drug trafficking) and improved its communication systems  (Marks 8). The 
expansion of its forces and their improvement in quality gave the FARC the operational ability to 
challenge battalion-size Colombian Army units in the late 1990s (Maddaloni 2009).  
 The status of the Colombian civil conflict in 1998 demonstrates the strong role the central 
government‟s weakness has played in guiding FARC‟s strategic decisions. The following 
vignette demonstrates the process by which the weakness of the Colombian state both affected 
the thinking of FARC‟s leadership and how it allowed FARC to secure a government-guaranteed 
safety zone for the rebel group‟s operations– the two key components of hypothesis two. 
The weakness of the Colombian government in the face of FARC‟s growing strength in 
the 1990s led Colombian President Pastrana to initiate a peace process in 1998.  As a condition 
for its participation in peace negotiations, FARC demanded the establishment of a safe-zone for 
its operations free of a government or paramilitary presence (Ruiz 6). Thus, in what many 
Colombian politicians and defense analysts viewed as an embarrassing demonstration of state 
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weakness, the Pastrana administration in late 1998 granted FARC control of a massive area of 
south-central Colombia rich in coca production known as the zona de despeje (Thoumi 2002).    
In the first planned major meeting of the two parties, President Pastrana scheduled to 
convene with FARC‟s commandante, Marulanda Sureshot, on January 7, 1999 at meeting also 
attended by Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua as a representative of the FARC (Ruiz 2001).  Pastrana 
had staked substantial political capital on the meeting, as he had come under heavy criticism for 
granting the FARC a demilitarized zone of operation (Ruiz 20001).  Sureshot did not show up to 
the scheduled meeting, embarrassing Pastrana in front of dozens of reporters covering the event 
(Ruiz 2001). Daniel Ortega spoke on behalf of the FARC, saying “logically, if a revolutionary 
group is getting stronger, then the possibilities increase that they could overthrow the established 
order and take power by force” (Ruiz 2001).  Other evidence also points to the fact that 
Marulanda and the FARC viewed the very existence of peace talks as a demonstration of the 
state‟s weakness and a capitulation to the rebel group‟s strength. In a March 1999 interview with 
El Tiempo, Marulanda echoed Ortega, remarking that  the FARC‟s military advances had 
“brought the struggle to a new stage, in which the Colombian government had been forced to 
“agree to negotiations,” and that FARC would not repeat “past errors” in failing to continue the 
“struggle until victory” (Rabasa and Chalk 2001).  
 In the end, as Ortega and Marulanda acknowledged, Pastrana‟s granting of the despeje 
zone underlined the state‟s weakness in FARC‟s eyes, thereby detracting from the likelihood of 
peace and contributing to the operational strength of FARC. The FARC took advantage of the 
zone‟s safety from military attack by using it as a sanctuary from which to rest and refit its 
forces, move drugs and arms, hold prisoners and hostages, and launch operations, such as a July 
1999 multi-pronged attack involving 4,000 FARC fighters (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). The FARC 
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made a rational calculation in 1999 that so long as the military trends ran in their favor, they 
might have been able to win a military victory over the entire state (or at least dictate the terms 
of the peace), thus removing any incentive for the group to reach an immediate settlement with 
the government (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). 
The above evidence points to the strong validity of hypothesis two in the FARC case. The 
Colombian state lacked capacity to control its territory from its very inception.  The Pastrana 
administration‟s attempt at a peace process in 1998 and FARC‟s subsequent rebuff of these 
overtures reveal both the weakness of the Colombian government and the degree to which this 
weakness entered FARC‟s strategic calculations.  Furthermore, FARC‟s control of about 40 
percent of Colombian territory in the late 1990s, including the state-granted coca rich despeje 
zone, allowed the rebel group to gain operational autonomy by leveraging Colombian state 
weakness to boost its narcotics revenue stream. 
 Hypothesis 3: The prospect of international sanctions against a state government involved in 
the drug trade imparts disproportionate financial benefits on rebel groups engaged in drug 
trafficking versus states, giving them operational independence to seek a takeover of the 
central government. 
The financial windfall from the taxation of and direct involvement in drug production no 
doubt contributed to FARC‟s military successes over Colombian government forces throughout 
the 1990s. The elimination of mega-cartel rivals and the expansion of the number of hectares 
dedicated to coca cultivation led to substantial gains in the FARC‟s quality of force; the rebel 
group purchased new weapons (often smuggled through the same channels used for drug 
trafficking) and improved its communication systems  (Marks 2002). The expansion of its forces 
and their improvement in quality gave the FARC the ability to challenge battalion-size 
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Colombian Army units in the late 1990s (Maddaloni 2009). The increased size and quality of 
FARC forces led to the launch of mobile warfare in 1996, which included surprise attacks (often 
successful) against a Colombian military that in its disposition and dispersal “resembled…the 
U.S. Army during the Indian Wars rather than an organization geared up for mobile warfare” 
(Marks 2002). A secret US government report leaked to the Washington Post from the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) 1998 confirms the dire situation of the Colombian government in late 
1990s:  
“Of the 120,000 [Colombian] armed forces members only 20,000 are equipped and 
prepared for combat… Standard military doctrine holds that a regular army needs a 10 to 
1 advantage in size to defeat a well-equipped and steadfast insurgency…the guerillas 
have been fighting the government for the past three decades but have never before 
evinced the strength now attributed to them. According to US and Colombian officials, 
the rebel groups control more than 40 percent of Colombia…About two-thirds of FARC 
units…are involved in drug trafficking, according to US and Colombian intelligence 
sources, providing…the group with tens of millions of dollars to finance [its] 
operations…Colombia is the most threatened in the area under the Southern Command‟s 
responsibility…” (Ruiz 2001) 
As evidenced in the US intelligence estimate above, the Colombian military did not possess 
anywhere close to the 10:1 manpower advantage required of a regular army to defeat an 
insurgency; to the contrary, the ranks of the FARC swelled during this period to near parity with 
the 20,000 Colombian soldiers “prepared for combat.” 
 Evidence suggests the validity of the notion that the government‟s lack of participation in 
the drug business “imparts disproportionate financial benefits on rebel groups” (i.e. the FARC).  
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Without a doubt, FARC‟s access to drug revenue, as described in its initial 1982 strategic plan 
(see the section below “Hypothesis 1”), gave the rebel group access to human and material 
resources that enabled it to exploit Colombia‟s state weakness.  Beyond revenue, FARC‟s 
involvement in drug cultivation in the llanos region created for the rebel group a rural base of 
support, premised on aligned economic interests vis-à-vis the drug trade, which the government 
has never been able to build.  At the same time, the growth of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s had a destabilizing effect on the Colombian government, fueling high 
rates of crime and rampant corruption which undermined the government‟s legitimacy (Rabasa 
and Chalk 2001).  Thus, it appears that in the case of FARC, the rebel group has been able to 
exploit drug funding without losing legitimacy among its base of support; indeed, it designed its 
war economy to provide a base of popular support among coca-growing peasants.  At the same 
time, the Colombian government‟s involvement in the drug business appears to have a 
delegitimizing effect,   such as the substantial loss of international and domestic legitimacy after 
drug syndicates helped finance the 1994 election campaign of President Ernesto Samper (Rabasa 
and Chalk 2001).  Indeed, the Pastrana administration worked hard to reverse the Clinton 
Administration‟s decertification of the country as a partner in the “War on Drugs.” On the whole, 
evidence points to the validity of hypothesis three in the FARC case. 
 Hypothesis 4: The potential for revenue from the drug trade incentivizes rebel groups to 
maintain a non-separatist posture in the sense that they seek the perpetuation of conflict in 
order to maximize their profit. 
As mentioned in the “Research Design” section of this paper,  this paper utilizes a broad 
definition of non-separatist groups, including both those groups whose goal  it is to take over a 
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state‟s central government, as well as groups whose primary goal it is to perpetuate conflict in 
order to maximize profits, or otherwise.   
There is no doubt that the narcotics business has at times informed the military strategy of 
FARC. For example, the goal of consolidating its control of prime coca-growing areas in the 
southern and eastern parts of Colombia dictated FARC‟s initial plans for military expansion in 
the 1980s (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). Once FARC gained control of these areas, the 1982 
strategic plan affirmed, the rebel group could expand its operations to the entire country, with a 
particular focus on controlling “strategic corridors” around seaports and large cities (Rabasa and 
Chalk 2001). The control of these corridors would serve two complementary purposes: to 
increase the ease with which drugs and other supplies could be trafficked, and to allow the 
FARC to cut cities off from vital supply and communication lines to the countryside (Rabasa and 
Chalk 2001). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the FARC did expand its presence in the 
richest coca producing regions of Caqueta, Meta, and the Magdalena Valley  (Maddaloni 2009).  
 At the same time that FARC‟s business interests impact its military strategy, it is difficult 
to say with confidence that FARC continues its fight solely in order to maximize or sustain drug 
trafficking generated profits. To the extent that FARC has created a narco-economy that both 
supports and depends upon its war effort, the profit motive continues to fuel conflict. Interviews 
and public statements by FARC leaders continue to indicate the strong ideological orientation of 
the rebel group (Granda 2007). FARC spokesman Rodrigo Granda asserted in a 2008 interview 
that “there is no way the FARC–EP is a drug trafficker,” although he acknowledged that the 
group‟s involvement in the narcotics industry as a natural “by-products of the general situation in 
the country,” saying in that FARC has “no authority to force people to abandon so-called illicit 
crops without giving them an alternative” (Granda 2007).  The FARC‟s 1982 decision to enter 
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the narcotics business and its reliance on both drug money and a base of rural coca farmers 
supports the notion of conflict perpetuation for profit maximization.  
 Hypothesis 5: The presence of contraband exacerbates principal-agent problems in rebel 
groups by allowing soldiers the opportunity to accumulate personal wealth. Such personal 
predation creates discipline problems at the expense of a rebel group’s central organization, 
making peace agreements difficult to enforce because financial opportunities provided by 
conflict are more attractive to combatants than peace (Ross 2004).   
As discussed previously, the collapse of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the mid-1990s 
caused the fragmentation of the drug trafficking business in Colombia, and presented FARC with 
new opportunities to involve itself in the higher profit downstream processes of drug production 
and distribution (DeAtley 2010). The general trend of atomization within the Colombian drug 
trade also occurred within FARC; as the rebel group expanded its geographic footprint, drug 
trafficking became an important part of territorial control, and thus required business plans 
tailored to each particular combat front (DeAtley 2010).  FARC‟s internal structure loosened 
during the 1990s, with autonomy for individual fronts existing within a “framework of 
distributed control” (DeAtley 2010). In other words, while there exists an overarching ideology 
and mission,  regional and local leaders enjoy wide latitude regarding conformation to these 
organizational dictates; furthermore, regional commanders possess even greater autonomy in the 
operational realm than the ideological one (DeAtley 2010).The nature of the narcotics trade and 
the manner in which FARC manages its finances within each front (by designing a “business 
plan” specific to each region) all but necessitates the regional flexibility granted to local 
commanders in terms of day-to-day operations. Thus, the decentralized nature of FARC‟s non-
military elements creates the base upon which internal corruption and indiscipline can thrive. 
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 Analysts have long commented that FARC does not speak with one voice – some 
combatants appear more ready to disarm and turn to politics than other, with a small group of 
leaders fascinated by the power and money brought by the drug trade refuse to disarm (van 
Engeland Rudolph 1988). Recent events point to increased corruption within FARC‟s ranks. A 
December 2010 article featured in El Tiempo (Colombia‟s highest circulation newspaper) 
discussed the defection of 6 high ranking FARC officials with substantial amounts of money 
earned through the narcotics trade, including one guerilla lieutenant known as “Cachirri” who 
served as finance chief in the town of Mapiripan and made off with 2.2m pesos. Others stole in 
excess of 100 million pesos, such as one FARC commander with the nom de guerre “The 
Lieutenant” who embezzled 600 million pesos (El Tiempo 2010).  The article goes on to cite a 
2009 email written to the FARC secretariat by Mono Jojoy, the former top military commander 
of FARC killed by Colombian military forces in September 2010, which states “the economic 
crisis currently affecting us is the sole product of the lack of discipline and commitment among 
commanders” (El Tiempo 2010).  
 Another instance of internal disciplinary issues occurred in 2008 when a subordinate 
killed senior FARC commander Ivan Rios, the youngest member of FARC‟s seven member 
secretariat (BBC 2008). As reflected in Mono Jojoy‟s later 2009 email, concerns developed after 
Rios‟ death that mid-level commanders within FARC sought to gain control of various revenue 
streams  (including of course narco-trafficking) from their superiors, thereby causing an internal 
breakdown of discipline. Other analysts point to the fact that the increased tempo of fighting as a 
result of massive US military aid inflows to Colombia have caused both a leadership shortage 
(because of killings and assimilation) and an increased rate of turnover within FARC‟s ranks 
(Saskiewicz 2005). These two factors have a compounding effect on the organizational cohesion 
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of FARC: the loss of key leaders harms FARC‟s political orientation, providing its new members 
with few ideological zealots from which to learn the insurgency‟s political goals (Saskiewicz 
2005). Lacking discipline has in the past affected peace negotiations;  for example, in 1999 
members of a FARC Front killed three American indigenous rights activist,  an action that 
harmed the rebel group‟s embryonic peace negotiations with the Pastrana administration and led 
to a harsh internal punishment  against the perpetrators (Torres 2008). 
 The evidence outlined above demonstrates the principal-agent problems that have 
emerged within FARC in part because of the group‟s involvement in the drug trade. The rebel 
group‟s geographic dispersement, its desire to maintain an “autarchic” character, and its reliance 
on drug-related revenue, combine to produce a situation that requires organizational 
decentralization.  This decentralized structure has led to weakness in discipline, often involving 
internal corruption related to the appropriation of organizational resources for personal use. 
Finally, the breakdown in discipline, although difficult to measure in its breadth across FARC‟s 
many fronts, has in the past affected peace negotiations contrary to the wishes of the rebel 
group‟s central leadership. Thus, evidence indicates the validity of hypothesis five in the case of 
the FARC.  
Conclusion 
 Understanding the reasons for FARC‟s adoption of a strategy involving revenue from 
illegal narcotics sheds new light on the group‟s non-separatist aims.  The FARC-Colombia case 
provides strong supporting evidence for all five hypotheses.  
 As for hypothesis one, FARC did not initially organize around  exploitation of the 
illegal narcotics market; to the contrary, the group prohibited participation in or taxation of the 
drug trade by its members until the group‟s landmark seventh conference in 1982. Furthermore, 
Drugs and Revolution 
 Spitzer | 48 
 
FARC made a conscious decision to involve itself in the drug business as a means to gain 
revenue and recruits by aligning its economic interests with those in its rural territorial base.  
 In support of hypothesis two, the historic weakness of the Colombian state in the 
llanos region (about 95% of its territory) provided FARC with the opportunity to organize a 
rebellion, and the ability to sustain it through drug cultivation beyond the government‟s direct 
purview. The Pastrana administration‟s gift of a massive safe zone (zona de despeje) to FARC in 
1998 as a precondition for peace talks, and the rebel group‟s subsequent rebuff of these 
overtures, reveal both the weakness of the Colombian government and the degree to which this 
weakness entered FARC‟s strategic calculations. 
 The financial windfall from the taxation of and direct involvement in drug production 
no doubt contributed to FARC‟s military successes over Colombian government forces 
throughout the 1990s, as suggested by hypothesis three.  FARC‟s access to drug revenue, as 
described in its initial 1982 strategic plan (see the section below “Hypothesis 1”), gave the rebel 
group access to human and material resources that enabled it to exploit Colombia‟s state 
weakness.  The Clinton Administration‟s decertification of Colombia as a partner in the War on 
Drugs caused substantial demonstrates the delegitimizing effects of even the perception of a 
government‟s connection to the narcotics trade.  Beyond revenue, FARC‟s involvement in drug 
cultivation in the llanos region created for the rebel group a rural base of support, premised on 
aligned economic interests vis-à-vis the drug trade, which the government has never been able to 
build.   
 Hypothesis four remains difficult to prove, as doing so requires clear documentation of 
internal FARC elements proclaiming the primacy of profit over ideology as motivating the 
perpetuation in the conflict, an act sure to be unpopular with the central organization‟s political 
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bureau. Nonetheless, to the extent that FARC has created a narco-economy that both supports 
and depends upon its war effort, the profit motive continues to fuel conflict. 
 Finally, evidence does suggest that the narcotics trade has caused discipline problems 
within FARC, especially in recent years.  Recent high-profile defections of FARC commanders 
involving large sums of narcotics-generated money reflect this trend. In addition, the wide 
operational latitude regional FARC leaders enjoy has created a highly decentralized organization 
with unique vulnerabilities to profit motives and graft.   
III. The Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia 
Historical Introduction: Emergence of the GAM 
 The separatist conflict in the Indonesian province of Aceh began  in 1976 with the 
founding of the GAM, or Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka).  Although Hasan di 
Tiro, a descendant of an Acehnese family infamous for its anti-colonial fervor, founded the Free 
Aceh Movement in 1976, the rebel group remained a small operation throughout the 1980s and 
90s, not causing significant armed conflict on the scale of a civil war until 1998.  
 The concept of an Acehnese nation arose in its modern form in rough concurrence with 
GAM‟s establishment in the 1970‟s as a reaction to the activities of the Indonesian state.*  With a 
population of 4.5 million people, Aceh is located on the northern tip of Indonesia‟s largest island, 
Sumatra. Despite the power and influence of the Acehnese sultanate in the seventeenth through 
nineteenth centuries, the sultanate never maintained strong central control over its area of 
influence in a manner that approached the outlines of a modern nation-state. After a protracted 
thirty year war against the forces of the Dutch, Acehnese Sultan Muhammad Daud surrendered 
his territory to the invading colonialists in 1903. 
                                                 
*
 Unless otherwise noted, information in this introductory section comes from Edward Aspinall‟s 2002 and 2007 
articles or Michelle Ann Milller‟s 2009 book (see bibliography for details), unless otherwise noted. 
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 After enduring several years of Japanese occupation during the Second World War, 
Indonesia underwent a four year struggle for independence with the Dutch that successfully 
concluded in 1949. The Acehnese leadership and people tended to identify with the cause of 
Indonesian independence, and nobody made a substantial case in the 1940s for Acehnese 
independence.  The secular roots of the Indonesian republic, which contrasted with the 
traditional strain of Islam practiced in Aceh and other parts of Indonesia, caused considerable 
tensions with the central government in the early 1950s. This friction triggered a large-scale 
armed rebellion in the 1950s, led by a group known as Darul Islam, which advocated the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and included members from across the Indonesian 
archipelago. 
 Leaders of the Darul Islam rebellion accused the Indonesian government of employing 
the colonial state apparatus of the Dutch in order to assert the government‟s power across the 
new state. Acehnese members of Darul Islam aired additional concerns regarding the state‟s 
encroaching power after Aceh‟s incorporation into the larger province of North Sumatra in 
August 1950. In order to put an end to the rebellion, the central government reached a settlement 
with the Acehnese faction of Darul Islam by agreeing to grant Aceh a “special status” within the 
Indonesian state, permitting the region a certain level of autonomy while acknowledging the role 
of Islamic law in Aceh. 
 As Aspinall writes, through the Indonesian state‟s declaration of Aceh as a “special 
region,” the government “normalized and celebrated Acehnese ethnic identity and embedded 
within it a notion that the Acehnese were deserving of special status and treatment.” 
Furthermore, the designation of Aceh as a “special province” created definite state-sanctioned 
geographic bounds to modern Aceh, thereby territorializing Acehnese identity to a historically 
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unprecedented extent. The simultaneous territorialization of Acehnese identity and the 
development of a sense of entitlement to special treatment  by the Indonesian government among 
the Acehnese, represented important ideological precedents for the Free Aceh Movement a 
quarter century later.  
 Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the Indonesian government took on an ever more 
authoritarian character, a situation that inflamed the Acehnese who had come to believe in a 
certain level of autonomy for themselves in the aftermath of the Darul Islam rebellion.  
Following the 1950s settlement with Acehnese rebel leaders, the Indonesian central government 
relied upon a cadre of Acehnese technocrats loyal to the central government to implement its 
policies. This group of technocrats, which tended to exclude members of Darul Islam, triggered 
the growth of an Acehnese counter elite organized around the kinship and other networks of the 
Darul Islam rebellion. This group, which Aspinall terms “ethnic political entrepreneurs,” formed 
the locus of the future Free Aceh Movement (GAM), emphasizing in their rhetoric Acehnese 
mistreatment and exploitation by Javanese Indonesians. 
 After its founding in 1976, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) remained a small group 
with about one hundred members and did not develop into a military actor for about a decade.  
During the early 1970s, multinational corporations began large-scale mineral extraction activities 
in Aceh, in particular the Arun natural gas field. These large projects produced resentment 
among some Acehnese that the natural resources of their province were being exploited to 
benefit “Java” (i.e. the central government), causing GAM to mention resource exploitation in its 
1976 founding document (Ross 2007).   
The growth of GAM in the late 1980s caused the Indonesian government to launch an 
aggressive counterinsurgency campaign against the separatist group, a step that led to the 
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establishment of a “Military Operations Area” (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM) across all of 
Aceh. This military zone, or DOM, forced most of GAM‟s operations outside of Indonesia, and 
lasted until the fall of the three decade long presidency of Suharto in 1998. Although the end of 
DOM included the evacuation of all “non-organic” (non-Acehnese) Indonesian soldiers from 
Aceh in 1998, the repressive nature of the DOM regime had long before sowed the seeds of 
resentment that allowed for GAM‟s revival later that year. 
 The withdrawal of non-organic Indonesian security forces from Aceh in 1998, combined 
with the state‟s lack of a clear policy toward the restive province, caused a power vacuum to 
develop in Aceh. The existing Acehnese antipathy toward the central government mixed with 
widespread grievances about the DOM, allowing anti-government elements to gain a substantial 
political foothold in Aceh after Suharto‟s resignation.  Acehnese anger towards the central 
Indonesian government began to manifest itself as support for GAM. The return to Aceh of about 
400 GAM rebels from Malaysia and the granting of a general amnesty to 562 GAM members 
imprisoned in Indonesian jails in late 1998 helped contribute to GAM‟s revitalization after the 
end of DOM.  
In late 1998 violence intensified in Aceh, as the number of GAM rallies, attacks on 
Indonesian government facilities, and assassinations of Indonesian security forces all increased. 
Moreover, the decision by Indonesia‟s President Habibie to grant East Timor a referendum on 
independence in order to solve another of Indonesia‟s long-standing civil conflicts galvanized 
support among the Acehnese public for a separatist solution. The East Timor situation led to the 
creation of SIRA (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh) a “Congress of Students and Youth of 
Away Acehnese” in order to “free the Acehnese people from external and internal colonization 
and oppression, and to fight for the realization of civil society.” This group, although more urban 
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than GAM and generally opposed to violence, provided an important base of grassroots support 
for GAM throughout the conflict‟s duration. 
Between 1998 and 2004, the level of violence in Aceh rose to unprecedented levels, 
transforming into Indonesia‟s most significant domestic problem. Acehnese society united 
against the repression of the Indonesian government, across class,  age, and political lines. By 
2001 GAM controlled about 70 percent of Aceh; two to three civilians died per day at the hands 
of Indonesian security forces, while GAM murdered suspected spies, non-Acehnese, and 
government officials. In 2002, the tide turned in favor of Indonesian security forces; indeed by 
the rebels‟ own admission, Indonesian security forces had reduced the rebel group‟s control over 
Aceh to 30-40 percent of its territory. Although peace talks took place on several occasions, they 
were hampered by disagreements about the need for an international mediator, as well as ever-
persistent violence on the ground. 
The destructive 2004 tsunami in Indonesia changed the dynamic of the Aceh conflict in 
fundamental ways. The disaster prompted GAM‟s leadership to declare a unilateral cease fire, in 
order to allow the cleanup of bodies and the maximum level of aid to reach the devastated 
province. The tsunami provided the opportunity for both GAM and the Indonesian government 
to reassess their positions vis-à-vis the Aceh conflict. The nature of the global reaction to the 
tsunami led to a strong international presence in Aceh, including personnel from foreign 
militaries and international aid organizations. In many ways, the international attention focused 
on Aceh in the aftermath of the tsunami forced the government‟s hand in caving to one of 
GAM‟s basic demands: an international mediator for peace negotiations. GAM had long desired 
increased international recognition of its struggle against the Indonesian government, and viewed 
an international mediation forum as a means to get the attention of a wider global audience. 
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While the Indonesian government opposed the “internationalization” of what it viewed as a 
domestic security problem, the increased attention toward Aceh after the tsunami made 
participation in an internationally-mediated negotiation forum with GAM more easily 
acceptable. On August 15, 2005, GAM and the Indonesian government signed an agreement 
known as the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that required the rebel group to 
cease armed hostilities and disarm in exchange for the gradual withdrawal of government 
security forces in Aceh.  
The Indonesian government enshrined the content of the agreement into domestic law 
through the passage of law No. 11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) in July 2006 
(Miller 2009). The law attempts to institutionalize Acehnese autonomy within the confines of 
Indonesian central government through revenue sharing  (70% of natural gas revenue returns to 
Aceh‟s provincial government) and provisions allowing for direct Acehnese local elections. The 
LoGA provides Aceh with far more autonomy than Indonesia‟s other provinces, and a double 
portion of a national economic development block grant program in relation to other provinces.  
Above all other arrangements, the LoGA allows  GAM and SIRA to reap political benefits due to 
provisions guaranteeing the right to field independent party candidates in local elections and to 
organize Aceh-based political parties. In 2006, GAM„s successor party won the first 
gubernatorial elections in Aceh by an unexpectedly wide margin. 
GAM Applied to the Theoretical Framework  
The below discussion will explore the internal dynamics of GAM and the Indonesian security 
forces in the context of the theoretical framework of this paper in an attempt to prove the 
theoretical framework‟s negative validity when applied to a separatist conflict that does not 
involve substantial funding from  lootable resources.  
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 Hypothesis 1: Non-separatist rebel groups do not organize around lootable resource 
exploitation; instead, over the course of a conflict, they create war economies using lootable 
resources because such resources produce widespread economic benefits for the population 
of the region where they are produced (Ross 2003).  
As a result of its focus on non-separatist rebel groups, hypothesis one does not provide 
substantial explanative information related to the GAM-Indonesia civil conflict.  At the same 
time, several points related to the founding of the Free Aceh Movement deserve mention. 
GAM‟s founding document, labeled an Acehnese “Declaration of Independence,” charges 
the Indonesian government with pilfering Acehnese “property” for the benefit of the  
“foreign regime of Jakarta” (di Tiro 1976).  The document does not make explicit reference to 
the natural gas facility in the province (which would have been a new facility at the time Hasan 
di Tiro wrote the “Declaration of Independence”) nor does it criticize the multinational 
corporations involved in gas extraction (di Tiro 1976).  Despite this lack of criticism in its 
founding document, one of GAM‟s first acts of violence occurred when a group of rebel fighters 
attacked one of Aceh‟s natural gas production facilities (Ross 2005).   
Michael Ross theorizes that if a resource “is relatively unlootable, it is more likely to 
generate revenues for skilled workers (who are less likely to be from the region), the extraction 
firm, and the government – and hence to produce grievances about the distribution of resource 
wealth” (2003). The circumstances of the Aceh conflict appear to support this corollary to 
hypothesis one, as GAM often complained that resource revenue of Acehnese origin benefitted 
“foreign” elements, going so far as to speculate that an independent Aceh would achieve wealth 
on the level of Brunei  (Ross 2005).   
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The focus of the Free Aceh Movement on independence and the redistribution of mineral 
resource revenue, as outlined in the group‟s founding document, helps to explains the absence of 
narcotic-related revenue in the conflict.  Michael Ross writes of four ways the natural gas facility 
in Aceh produced resentment among the Acehnese population: first, its very construction 
displaced hundreds of families from their homes (Ross 2002). Second, the influx of non-
Acehnese workers sparked an anti-immigrant backlash, which combined with and  galvanized 
general anti-government feelings (Ross 2002). Third, the natural gas plant discharged chemicals 
which led to health problems among certain segments of the Acehnese population (Ross 2002). 
Fourth, the facility required a heavy presence of government security forces, while the plant‟s 
revenue generated corruption among Acehnese officials (Ross 2002).  The importance of these 
natural gas-related grievances combined with outstanding Acehnese antipathy toward the 
Indonesian government to sharpen GAM‟s focus on gaining access to natural gas revenue as 
opposed to other sources.  Furthermore, the Islamic clerical community in Aceh (known as the 
ulama), second only to GAM in its influence over the population, constrained the rebel group‟s 
ability to engage in “amoral” activity such as drug trafficking.  
GAM‟s primary funding sources further indicate the way Aceh‟s dominant religion, Islam, 
influenced the rebel group‟s activities.  In particular, GAM levied a “state tax” on all elements of 
Acehnese society, a system based on the Islamic “infaq,” or war tax (Sculze 2004).  Beyond 
taxation of the population, GAM also received substantial donations from expatriate Acehnese 
populations around the world, while it derived a limited portion of its income from criminal 
activities such as kidnapping for ransom (Schulze 2004). Although analysts have suspected 
GAM‟s involvement in the Acehnese marijuana trade, such participation remains unverified; in 
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addition, even if the group did participate in the marijuana trade, such revenue appears to have 
represented a negligible portion of the rebel group‟s overall budget (Schulze 2004).  
Thus, the nature of GAM‟s funding sources, combined with the group‟s original focus on 
independence and unlootable resource revenue created a situation that disincentivized 
participation in the illegal narcotics trade. The Free Aceh Movement enjoyed the support of a 
wide swath of the Acehnese population based on its organizational goals and a common enmity 
toward the Indonesian government; the rebel group did not need to create a system  (like that of 
the FARC) that tied conflict to economic betterment in order to build a base of popular support 
and perpetuate conflict.  
 Hypothesis 2: State weakness, related to both capacity and territorial control, causes rebel 
groups to believe they have a decent chance of taking over the entire state. Second, state 
weakness provides rebel groups an operating base beyond the states control where lootable 
resources can be produced. 
The greatest weakness of the Indonesian government was the poor professionalism and lack 
of discipline within the ranks of its military forces (Schulze 2004). The rivalry between 
Indonesia‟s civilian leadership and its military further harmed the state‟s ability to act in a 
coherent manner against the GAM rebels (Panontongan 2005).  Indeed for much of the conflict, 
Indonesia‟s elected government found itself unable to control the conduct and activities of its 
own military units (Panontongan 2005).  This lack of central command produced problems of 
widespread military predation in Aceh and complicated peace talks with GAM, points discussed 
in relation to hypotheses three, four, and five.  
Despite the deficiencies of central control within the Indonesian government, the state 
maintained well-entrenched control of the vast majority of its territory throughout the civil 
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conflict in Aceh.  The illegitimacy of the Indonesian state among the Acehnese population, and 
the government‟s temporary loss of control of 70 percent of the province‟s territory in the early 
2000‟s, did not hamper the larger Indonesian state‟s capacity or autonomy to act against rebels.  
Severe internal problems notwithstanding, the Indonesian government remained strong 
throughout the Acehnese civil conflict. The Indonesian government‟s relative strength did not 
impact GAM‟s goals or its funding sources; the Free Aceh Movement never harbored any desire 
to take over the entire Indonesian state inspired by the central government‟s weakness. 
Moreover, the goal of overthrowing the Indonesian central government would have contradicted 
GAM‟s raison d'être – Acehnese independence. 
As discussed under hypothesis one, GAM‟s primary goal of independence and secondary aim 
of securing an increased proportion of natural gas revenue for Aceh, as well as the influence of 
the Islamic ulama in the province, precluded the rebel group‟s involvement in the narcotics trade. 
Thus, GAM eschewed the narcotics business despite its control at one point of over 70 percent of 
Acehnese provincial territory. 
 Hypothesis 3: The prospect of international sanctions against a state government involved in 
the drug trade imparts disproportionate financial benefits on rebel groups engaged in drug 
trafficking versus states, giving them operational independence to seek a takeover of the 
central government. 
The Acehnese civil conflict presents an intriguing reversal of the typical pattern of 
narcotics-related predation.   The conflict in Aceh enabled the Indonesian military to resume 
its business activity in Aceh after the end of the DOM (“Military Operations Area”) in 1998. 
During the DOM period, the Indonesian Armed Forces (abbreviated with the acronym TNI) 
involved themselves in virtually every sector of the Acehnese economy, from small-scale 
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fishing, to logging, to natural gas extraction, and even arms sales to GAM rebels (Miller 
2009).  In addition, evidence indicates past direct military and police involvement in the 
cultivation and trafficking of marijuana in Aceh and Sumatra (Miller 2009).  The TNI 
resumed and expanded most of its DOM-era business activities after its reoccupation of Aceh 
in late 1998. The military provided the natural gas facilities in Aceh with protection 
throughout the DOM-era and the post-1998 conflict; companies such as ExxonMobil and PT 
Arun received security services in exchange for a fee paid to the TNI (McCulloch 2003). As 
one analyst writes, “the local military command (Aceh wide) [had] come to rely on the 
financial and logistic „support‟ of the [natural gas companies]” (McCulloch 2003). 
The secretive and non-official nature of the TNI‟s involvement the drug trade, the fact the 
drug most commonly trafficked in Aceh was marijuana, and the local nature of its 
consumption, prevented negative international ramifications stemming from the TNI‟s 
involvement in the Acehnese drug trade. As mentioned earlier, GAM derived most of its 
funding from foreign donations and a “state tax” on all elements of Acehnese society. 
Evidence in this case points to disproportionate economic benefits imparted on the military 
as a result of armed conflict, not on the rebel group.  This situation resulted from the 
institutionalized predation of the Indonesian Armed Forces combined with the nature of 
GAM‟s revenue, which shared a direct relation with the group‟s military success (i.e. the 
breadth of its territorial control).  As discussed in relation to hypothesis one, GAM‟s choice 
of funding source represented a direct outgrowth of its separatist goals – the loyalty of the 
Acehnese population, the success of the system of taxation, and the Islamic influence in 
Aceh, prevented GAM‟s entry into the drug business. Thus, the evidence in this case does not 
support hypothesis three.  
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 Hypothesis 4: The potential for revenue from the drug trade incentivizes rebel groups to 
maintain a non-separatist posture in the sense that they seek the perpetuation of conflict in 
order to maximize their profit. 
GAM derived the majority of its revenue from two sources: a “state tax” on all elements of 
Acehnese society and donations from expatriate Acehnese populations (Schulze 2004).  Criminal 
activity ranked a distant third as a revenue source for GAM, and evidence seems to indicate that 
most of this revenue arose from a limited number of kidnappings for ransom (Schulze 2004).  
The Free Aceh Movement‟s dependence on a domestic tax regime and foreign donations created 
a war economy that did not provide incentives for conflict perpetuation. To the contrary, the 
Indonesian government‟s control of natural gas revenue, the complexity of profitably exporting 
natural gas reserves, and GAM‟s desire to gain control of revenue generated by Aceh‟s natural 
gas together encouraged a quicker end to the conflict.  That is, GAM would enjoy a windfall 
from peace: a separate Acehnese nation would provide a formalized tax base and allow GAM to 
take full control of natural gas revenue.  
Throughout the Acehnese civil conflict, GAM maintained the clear political goal of 
independence based upon its 1976 founding document. Evidence does not suggest that the rebel 
group earned revenue during conflict at levels it could not have maintained during peacetime. In 
other words, peacetime would likely have earned GAM more revenue than wartime.    Proof of 
this arises from GAM‟s peaceful demobilization in the aftermath of the Helsinki MoU: in 
December 2005, GAM‟s former military commander Muzakkir Manaf pronounced the 
demobilization of GAM‟s military wing (Miller 2009).  The lack of profit motivation for conflict 
perpetuation may have increased GAM‟s willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the 
civil war. Long before the 2004 tsunami or the Helsinki MoU, GAM entered into peace 
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negotiations in 2000 with the administration of  Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid and 
subsequent Indonesian administration (Miller 2009). Although GAM‟s leadership initially 
rebuffed the government‟s offer to negotiate, the formation of a GAM breakaway group known 
as MP-GAM, which supported peace talks, compelled GAM‟s leader Hasan di Tiro to enter 
negotiations (Miller 2009).  As Miller writes, “If not for GAM‟s own commitment towards a 
peaceful settlement,” after the tsunami, “the rebels could have used the cessation of 
hostilities…to recruit new members and fortify their shadow civil administration” (Miller 2009). 
On the whole, the Free Aceh Movement faced both internal and external pressure to 
negotiate for peace, and lacked economic incentives for conflict perpetuation.  The smoothness 
of the group‟s eventual military demobilization further underlines this point.  
 Hypothesis 5: The presence of contraband exacerbates principal-agent problems in rebel 
groups by allowing soldiers the opportunity to accumulate personal wealth. Such personal 
predation creates discipline problems at the expense of a rebel group’s central organization, 
making peace agreements difficult to enforce because financial opportunities provided by 
conflict are more attractive to combatants than peace (Ross 2004).   
The presence of illegal narcotics in the Aceh conflict zone was quite limited. As mentioned 
under hypothesis three, evidence indicated direct military and police involvement in the 
cultivation and trafficking of marijuana in Aceh and Sumatra (Miller 2009).  The military also 
involved itself in virtually every sector of the Acehnese economy, from small-scale fishing, to 
logging, to natural gas extraction, and even arms sales to GAM rebels (Miller 2009).  Although 
military corruption did not lead to international sanctions against the Indonesian military or 
government, these business interests caused substantial principal-agent problems for the 
Indonesian government. On repeated occasions, the Indonesia‟s elected civilian leaders found 
Drugs and Revolution 
 Spitzer | 62 
 
themselves unable to control the activities or behavior of their own armed forces (TNI).  This 
situation made conducting a peace process quite difficult for Indonesia‟s political establishment, 
and the government faced an uphill battle convincing the military to honor the Helsinki MoU 
(Miller 2009).  
The Aceh civil conflict presents an example of a conflict where the typical pattern of 
principal-agent problems in profit-motivated rebel groups was reversed; instead the military 
participated in widespread corruption and predation, a situation which slowed the peace process 
(Miller 2009).  As noted under hypothesis four, the smoothness of GAM‟s military 
demobilization in the aftermath of the Helsinki MoU confirms the rebel group‟s strong internal 
discipline and central control.  The most significant breakaway group from GAM, the MP-GAM, 
agitated for peace negotiations to a greater extent than GAM‟s central leadership, evidencing the 
fallaciousness in the Aceh case of hypothesis five‟s contention that “financial opportunities 
provided by conflict are more attractive to combatants than peace.”  
Conclusion 
The Aceh case presents strong evidence of the negative validity of this paper‟s entire 
theoretical framework in relation to a separatist conflict that does not involve substantial funding 
from lootable resources.  
The nature of GAM‟s funding sources, combined with the group‟s original focus on 
independence and unlootable resource revenue, created a situation that disincentivized 
participation in the illegal narcotics trade. The Free Aceh Movement enjoyed the support of a 
wide swath of the Acehnese population based on its organizational goals and common enmity 
toward the Indonesian government; the rebel group did not need to create a system  (like that of 
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the FARC) that tied conflict to economic betterment in order to build a base of support or 
perpetuate conflict.  
The Indonesian government‟s relative strength did not impact GAM‟s goals or its funding 
sources; the Free Aceh Movement never harbored any desire to take over the entire Indonesian 
state inspired by the central government‟s weakness. Moreover, the goal of overthrowing the 
Indonesian central government would have contradicted GAM‟s raison d'être – Acehnese 
independence. 
The Free Aceh Movement faced both internal and external pressure to negotiate for peace, 
and lacked economic incentives for conflict perpetuation.  To the contrary, the Indonesian 
government‟s control of natural gas revenue, the complexity of profitably exporting natural gas 
reserves, and GAM‟s desire to gain control of revenue generated by unlootable natural gas 
together encouraged a quicker end to the conflict.  The Aceh civil conflict presents an example 
of a conflict where the typical pattern of principal-agent problems in profit-motivated rebel 
groups was reversed; instead the military participated in widespread corruption and predation, a 
situation which slowed the peace process from the government‟s end (Miller 2009). Finally, the 
smoothness of GAM‟s military demobilization in the aftermath of the Helsinki MoU confirms 
the rebel group‟s strong internal discipline and central control. 
IV. The Shining Path in Peru 
Historical Background: Peru and the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 
 Shining Path as a national organization relied on narcotics funding to a much lesser 
degree than FARC; but its regional offshoot in the Huallaga Valley, which has outlasted the 
national organization by at least two decades, depended upon coca cultivation to sustain its 
operations. As mentioned in the earlier discussion of case selection, the Shining Path does not 
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occupy as central a role in supporting this paper‟s theoretical framework as the FARC; however, 
Shining Path offers the chance to conduct an internal comparison of the same rebel group with 
and without access to substantial drug funding, a situation which produces noteworthy results.   
The Shining Path, known in Spanish as the Sendero Luminoso, began in the 1960s as a 
Maoist revolutionary group opposed to Peru‟s political system and led by philosophy professor 
Abimael Guzman (Greogy 2009). Although the group existed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it 
did not execute armed activities until 1980, just as Peru entered a new period of democratization 
after several years of military rule. Although the group advocated its own version of transparent 
democratic government, it opposed Peru‟s budding democratic government, desiring to 
overthrow the Peruvian government and replace it with a communist revolutionary command 
(Gregory 2009).  
The group capitalized on a combination of Peru‟s poor economic growth in the 1970s and 
the government‟s historic lack of presence in much of the country‟s highland and jungle regions 
in order to build a base of support (Weinstein 2007).  A Peruvian military-orchestrated effort at 
agrarian land reform failed to make a dent in the inequality of land distribution (Weinstein 2007). 
The southern highland region lacked even the most basic government services, while college 
educated Peruvians suffered from an unemployment rate double that of the general population 
(Weinstein 2007).  The annual growth rate in GDP per capita collapsed from an average of 2.5 
percent in the 1960s to less than 1.0 percent during the 1980s (Weinstein 2007). 
 Despite the reform-minded nature of the outgoing military regime and its well-known 
sympathy for peasant grievances, Sendero Luminoso exploited Peru‟s general economic malaise 
and the government‟s limited capacity in certain regions to grow into a full-scale rebel 
organization.  “The open political climate,” Jeremy Weinstein writes, “had little or no impact on 
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the rural highlands where Sendero was based” (2007).  Peru‟s major political organizations never 
constructed robust networks of support in the highland and jungle regions, a point which 
Abimael Guzman used for propagandistic purposes (Weinstein 2007).   
 Fierce commitment to Marxist ideology characterized the national Shining Path 
organization throughout its existence (Weinstein 2007). Guzman viewed himself as the “Fourth 
Sword of Marxism,” and reflected his ideological commitment in both the structure and 
recruitment strategy of the Shining Path (Weinstein 2007).  A Central Committee under Guzman 
set the group‟s national policy, while regional committees with substantial autonomy relied on 
small indoctrinated cadres to coordinate recruitment and  growth throughout Peru (Weinstein 
2007). Sendero‟s recruiting strategy put several obstacles in the way of becoming a full-fledged 
member of the rebel group, impediments designed to ensure individual ideological commitment 
of new recruits (Weinstein 2007). The Central Committee mandated procedures that required 
new members to pass a number of rigorous exams designed to test commitment to and 
knowledge of Sendero‟s ideology (Weinstein 2007).  These tests allowed the group to adopt its 
decentralized structure without sacrificing ideological commitment within its lower ranks 
(Weinstein 2007).  
 In 1982, the Peruvian government launched its first major military offensive against the 
Sendero Luminoso, a counterinsurgency operation in the rebel group‟s home province of 
Ayacucho (Weinstein 2007). While the military aspect of the civil conflict ebbed and flowed 
throughout the 1980s, Shining Path continued to expand its presence in Peruvian cities, towns, 
and rural areas. The group‟s reliance on so called “open committees,” which integrated civilian 
leadership into Sendero‟s regional committees, allowed it to gain power without substantial 
reliance on violent coercion (Weinstein 2007).  Furthermore, the incorporation of peasant 
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civilians into the decision-making ranks of the Shining Path eased the extraction of civilian-held 
resources needed to fund the rebel group‟s political and military efforts (Weinstein 2007).  In 
general, the Shining Path did not provide its communities with security in exchange for their 
loyalty; instead, based on its academic roots, Sendero provided basic services including 
education (which included a heavy dose of Marxist political indoctrination) and sought to recruit 
local contacts in order to propagate the group‟s message. As a result of the group‟s tendency to 
enjoy deep local roots in the communities it controlled, Sendero did not require resources from 
local civilians on a regular basis, although it did at times establish a “revolutionary tax” in 
certain areas (Weinstein 2007). 
The military wing of Sendero tended to target violent acts quite carefully against the most 
hated individuals in a community (thieves, rapists, crooks, adulterers, etc.) and against 
government officials as a means of executing “popular justice” (Weinstein 2007). This strategy 
allowed Sendero to gain the loyalty of local communities, while creating an environment of 
terror that deterred opposition to the group despite the irregular presence of armed guerillas 
(Weinstein 2007).  
 The decentralized nature of Sendero‟s geographic command structure allowed certain 
regional committees to stray from the group‟s ideological commitments and basic military 
strategy. In particular, the Regional Committee of Alto Huallaga, or CRH (Comite Regional del 
Alto Huallaga), developed as a rebel group all but independent of the organization‟s Central 
Committee.  The Huallaga Valley, especially its northern portion (known as the Upper Huallaga 
Valley, or UHV), hosted wide scale cultivation of coca leaf, the base ingredient of cocaine 
(Weinstein 2007).  The CRH began its involvement in the drug trade in style similar to FARC: it 
taxed production and other drug-trafficking related activities (Weinstein 2007). But over time, 
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the group deepened its participation in the drug business by displacing traffickers, cultivating 
coca on abandoned land, and operating centralized markets for outside buyers of coca leaf 
(Weinstein 2007).  In the Huallaga Valley, Sendero displaced much reviled drug traffickers who 
coerced and exploited peasant labor, instead providing peasants with guaranteed buyers and price 
through the operation of drug marketplaces (Weinstein 2007). Despite the persistent concerns of 
the Central Committee regarding even the perception of a connection between Sendero and drug 
traffickers, the decentralized nature of the rebel group allowed to CRH to continue its drug 
operations unabated. Over time, the local organization in the UHV transformed into one which 
relied on its ability to provide peasants with protection from drug traffickers and short-term 
economic gains in exchange for their loyalty to the rebel group (Weinstein 2007). Thus, the CRH 
took on a much different character than its parent organization, one which relied much less on 
ideology than common economic interests to gain support.  
 In 1988, Guzman and the Central Committee resolved to expand Sendero‟s rural 
mobilization strategy to Peru‟s cities, a decision which reflected the group‟s belief in its ability to 
overtake the central government (Weinstein 2007).  By the 1990s, Shining Path‟s military 
successes in both the cities and highland regions demonstrated the group‟s closeness to victory 
(Weinstein 2007). The government found its capacity greatly diminished as a result of the 
economic slowdown in the 1980s, and many believed it to be on the brink of collapse (Weinstein 
2007). But two important events reversed this course: the arrest of Abimael Guzman, and the 
“self-coup” by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimoro. Notwithstanding the government‟s general 
administrative weakness, successive presidential administrations had invested substantial 
resources in the intelligence unit of the national police. This investment paid off in 1992 when 
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the arrest of Guzman mushroomed into a broad crackdown on Sendero‟s leadership, one from 
which the rebel group would not recover.  
 The high-profile arrests of the Shining Path‟s central leadership created both morale and 
logistical problems for the rebel group (Weinstein 2007). Those rebel leaders who escaped the 
government dragnet proved unable to sustain the organization, and Sendero Luminoso collapsed 
by the mid-1990s (Weinstein 2007). Yet in one area of the country, the group remains 
operational: the Huallaga Valley.  The regular flow of drug funding, Sendero‟s creation of a 
regional narcotics-based war economy that depends upon conflict perpetuation for its survival, 
and the government‟s very limited presence in the Huallaga Valley together have allowed the 
CRH to persist well-beyond its parent organization.  
Sendero Luminoso and the CRH Applied to the Theoretical Framework 
 The Shining Path presents a fascinating example of a drug-funded non-separatist group 
because of its fragmented nature. While most of the organization did not receive or rely upon 
narcotic-related revenue to fund its efforts against the Peruvian government, a small segment of 
Sendero, which in the estimation of many analysts evolved into its own independent rebel group, 
encouraged and depended on drug money. Furthermore, this regional offshoot out-survived its 
parent organization by at least two decades, a development attributed by many to the nature of its 
financing. 
The below discussion will explore the internal dynamics of the Shining Path in the context of 
the five hypotheses proposed by this paper in an attempt to prove the theoretical framework‟s 
positive validity. 
 Hypothesis 1: Non-separatist rebel groups do not organize around lootable resource 
exploitation; instead, over the course of a conflict, they create war economies using lootable 
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resources because such resources produce widespread economic benefits for the population 
of the region where they are produced (Ross 2003).  
Like the FARC, the Shining Path began as an organization based on Marxist ideology. 
But to an even greater extent than FARC, Sendero Luminoso‟s roots in education fashioned an 
organization with a high level of discipline and dogged ideological devotion. Sendero 
Luminoso‟s general expansion strategy did not necessitate widespread taxation of civilian 
resources (Weinstein 2007). Instead, the group relied upon the tenacity of its cadres and the 
strength of its message to gain support among Peru‟s population (Weinstein 2007).  At times, 
this ideology-based strategy created problems for Sendero in areas where the rebel group lacked 
local contacts because its often white and urban cadres lacked an obvious shared political 
identity with highland peasants (many of whom were native Quechua Indians) (Weinstein 2007).  
Thus recruitment strategies in the high Andean areas sometimes relied on fear and coercion 
instead of ideological belief, a trend which hastened the desertion of peasants from the rebel 
group after the government‟s arrest of Abimael Guzman in 1992 (Weinstein 2007). 
 Unlike the ideology-based approach of the national Sendero group, the Huallaga Valley‟s 
Shining Path organization relied on the provision of short-term material rewards in exchange for 
the loyalty of peasants (Weinstein 2007).  CRH made promises of higher coca prices and 
protection from drug traffickers a central component of its propaganda (Weinstein 2007).  The 
group operated as an intermediary between growers and traffickers, a sort of armed collective 
bargaining organization (Kay 1999).  Militants employed in the CRH‟s armed ranks received 
compensation of $250 to $500 per month, an amount well in excess of Peru‟s average salary and 
several times higher than the salaries paid to teachers, the vocation of many who joined Sendero 
(Kay 1999). Revenue derived from the narcotics business permitted the CRH to purchase heavy 
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weaponry unavailable to other segments of the organization, a key element that helps to explain 
the group‟s long-term survival (Kay 1999).  Above all, the CRH managed to maintain the loyalty 
of its supporters despite the national Sendero organization‟s breakdown in leadership. This 
appears to have occurred because CRH succeeded in created war economy reliant on lootable 
resources that dispersed economic benefits among a wide swath of the population and also 
depended on conflict perpetuation.   
 Hypothesis 2: State weakness, related to both capacity and territorial control, causes rebel 
groups to believe they have a decent chance of taking over the entire state. Second, state 
weakness provides rebel groups an operating base beyond the states control where lootable 
resources can be produced. 
 The economic downturn that affected Peru in the 1970s and 80s damaged the state 
capacity to a great extent. As the tax base of the country contracted, rivalry between Peru‟s army 
and police forces increased because of competition over a dwindling security budget (Palmer 
1992). This internal conflict hindered police and military cooperation in operations against 
Sendero, a situation underlined the mismanagement of the Peruvian state and empowered the 
Shining Path. The historic lack of state presence in much Peru‟s highland and jungle regions also 
contributed to the ease with which Sendero‟s cadres infiltrated rural communities and overthrew 
government officials (Weinstein 2007).  Peru‟s political parties never established a strong 
presence in these areas; the lack of civic associations and identification with the central 
government created ripe conditions for Sendero infiltration (Kay 1999).  Peasants in these 
regions found themselves all but ignored by the Peruvian government, especially as resources 
became scarce with economic depression (Weinstein 2007).  In areas like the Upper Huallaga 
Valley, where the Shining Path would overtake and expand the region‟s drug economy, 
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government infrastructure barely existed; in fact the only road to the region was one lane wide 
and constructed in 1937 (Weinstein 2007).  The guerillas relied on their light footprint and 
relationship with the local population in order to exploit the government‟s lacking capacity 
(Weinstein 2007).  As a further indication of the state‟s weak capacity in rural regions, the 
government only began to undermine Sendero in the 1990s by forming community-based civil 
defense council, unable to implant its authority from outside highland and jungle regions (Kay 
1999). The state‟s weak capacity allowed Sendero Luminoso 1988 expansion of its rural-based 
strategy into Peru‟s largest cities, while affording regional offshoots like the CRH the ability to 
create mini-drug states unrestrained by central government authority. 
 Hypothesis 3: The prospect of international sanctions against a state government involved in 
the drug trade imparts disproportionate financial benefits on rebel groups engaged in drug 
trafficking versus states, giving them operational independence to seek a takeover of the 
central government. 
As discussed above under hypothesis two, the Peruvian government did not consider 
participation in the drug trade. Analysts disagree about the degree to which the influx of drug 
money from the Huallaga Valley region contributed to the national Shining Path organization. 
Some argue that drug money enabled Sendero to project a stronger national presence and expand 
its war into Peru‟s cities in 1988 (Kay 1999); others assert that the CRH retained most of its 
drug-related income, allowing it to invest in heavy weaponry and expand its presence in the 
Huallaga Valley (Weinstein 2007).  The evidence does indicate that the CRH gained substantial 
advantages over the government in the Huallaga Valley. In particular, as the state‟s capacity 
dwindled because of economic depression and a contracting tax base, high coca prices in the 
1980s supported CRH‟s military operations (Weinstein 2007).   At the same time, the rapid 
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collapse of the national Sendero Luminoso organization in the mid-1990s after the arrest of its 
central leadership suggests that the group as a whole did not enjoy disproportionate financial 
benefits or operational independence compared to the Peruvian state.  Thus, evidence for the 
validity of hypothesis three related to the national Shining Path organization remains mixed and 
inconclusive; however, strong evidence exists for hypothesis three in relation to the CRH.  
 Hypothesis 4: The prospect of international sanctions against governments involved in drug 
trafficking incentivizes rebel groups to maintain a non-separatist posture in the sense that 
they seek the perpetuation of conflict in order to maximize profit. 
 The Shining Path/CRH case provides very strong support for the notion that rebel groups 
maintain a non-separatist posture in the sense that they seek the perpetuation of conflict in order 
to maximize profit. The strong evidence for this phenomenon arises from the collapse of the 
ideology-based national Shining Path organization and the survival of its drug-funded offshoot, 
the Regional Committee of Alto Huallaga.  The documented marginalization of ideological goals 
within the CRH‟s ranks compared to the profit motive of the drug trade provides further 
evidence of CRH‟s perpetuation of conflict in order to maximize its revenue, albeit without any 
separatist intentions.  The Peruvian state, which relied heavily on US aid to combat drug 
cultivation within its borders, does not appear to have considered the drug trade a possible means 
through which to boost its capacity (Palmer 1992). As Bruce Kay argues, CRH represents an 
example of a “chronic insurgency,” one which lasts for years or even decades yet neither topples 
a regime nor suffers complete defeat by the state (Kay 1999).  The mutual economic interests of 
the rebel group ranks and the civilian population of the Huallaga Valley, who both rely upon 
coca leaf-generated revenue, help explain the reasons for non-separatist conflict in Peru.   
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 Hypothesis 5: The presence of contraband exacerbates principal-agent problems in rebel 
groups by allowing soldiers the opportunity to accumulate personal wealth. Such personal 
predation creates discipline problems at the expense of a rebel group’s central organization, 
making peace agreements difficult to enforce because financial opportunities provided by 
conflict are more attractive to combatants than peace (Ross 2004).   
The breakdown of discipline in the CRH versus the other regional committees of the Shining 
Path that did not rely upon drug-related revenue demonstrates the validity of hypothesis five, 
which predicts the existence of principal-agent problems when a rebel group involves itself in the 
drug trade.  As Weinstein writes, “membership in Sendero-Huallaga was prestigious not because 
it was a sign of political and ideological commitment, but instead because it provided access to 
profits from the coca business” (2007).  Widespread violations of the code of conduct decreed by 
Sendero‟s Central Committee occurred before and after the collapse of the national Sendero 
organization in the mid-1990s (Weinstein 2007).  Indeed, defection for personal gain was the 
group‟s modus operandi, with high rates of desertion in the CRH compared to other regional 
Sendero committees (Weinstein 2007).  The decentralized nature of the Sendero Luminoso 
organization allowed CRH to operate outside the central leadership‟s control, and prevented 
constraints to its profit-motivated behavior. In addition, the overwhelming power of the CRH‟s 
military wing compared to its political branch confirms the group‟s focus on short-term 
economic goals versus Shining Path‟s long-term ideological vision (Weinstein 2007).  The 
documented power of profit motives for maintaining the CRH‟s membership, the group‟s 
internal breakdown of discipline, and its survival beyond the national Sendero organization, all 
indicate the degree to which internal fragmentation perpetuated conflict (and the non-separatist 
goals undergirding it) by increasing financial opportunities provided by war. 
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Conclusion 
 The fragmented nature of the Shining Path‟s funding between the national organization 
and its regional offshoot in the Huallaga Valley creates a unique internal comparative case 
regarding the effects of drug funding on rebel group goals.  Despite government crackdowns and 
the collapse of its parent organization, the CRH continues to function at a low intensity 
throughout the Huallaga Valley (Kay 1999).  In December 2006, Shining Path killed five police 
officers and two workers from the National Coca Company (Gregory 2009). While the group 
remains too weak to launch a major offensive to take over the country, its base of narcotics 
revenue and appeal among the disaffected rural population remain threats to the Peruvian state 
(Gregory 2009).  
 CRH‟s reliance on short-term rewards as a recruitment incentive, its perpetuation of 
conflict for profit maximization despite the failure of its national parent organization, and its 
breakdown in discipline all indicate the strong effects drug funding has on rebel group goals. 
Sendero Luminoso and the CRH exploited the state‟s weakness in the context of a secular 
economic decline in order to expand its war effort. The group‟s non-separatist goals allowed its 
regional offshoot in the Huallaga Valley to become a “chronic insurgency” focused on conflict 
perpetuation for profit maximization.   Like the FARC in Colombia, the Shining Path lacks the 
capacity to seize state power, but remains capable of mobilizing mass support, controlling 
territories, generating revenue, and unleashing social energies that shape the state‟s political 
landscape (Kay 1999).  
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V. Conclusion of Thesis 
This thesis seeks to answer the broad question: how does drug funding affect rebel group 
goals? More specifically, it attempts to explore why rebel groups reliant upon substantial 
narcotics-related revenue tend to be non-separatist in nature.   
 The thesis features a theoretical framework to investigate these questions, measuring 
three cases against five hypotheses through an in-depth qualitative approach. Hypothesis one 
predicts that non-separatist rebel groups create war economies using lootable resources because 
such resources produce widespread economic benefits for the population of the region where 
they are produced.  Hypothesis two asserts that state weakness both incentivizes non-separatist 
rebel group goals and provides an operating base beyond state control to produce drugs. 
Hypothesis three supports the notion that the drug trade gives rebel groups the financial benefits 
that allow them the operational independence to seek a takeover of the central government.  
Hypothesis four contends that rebel groups maintain a non-separatist posture in the sense that 
they seek the perpetuation of conflict in order to maximize profit. Hypothesis five predicts that 
principal-agent and discipline problems arise because of of a rebel group‟s involvement in the 
drug trade. 
 The application of these three cases to this paper‟s theoretical framework produces 
several important conclusions.  First, as hypothesis one suggests, non-separatist groups create 
war economies involving lootable resources in order to produce widespread economic benefits 
for the population of areas under their control. Evidence of this exists within the FARC case, 
where the rebel group made a conscious decision to exploit the drug trade as a means to build a 
base of popular support and to gain revenue in furtherance of its non-separatist goals. In Peru, the 
CRH made a similar calculation, despite the concerns of Sendero Luminoso‟s national leaders, a 
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decision which allowed the regional group to survive well beyond the leadership collapse of its 
parent organization. In Indonesia, GAM‟s focus on independence and access to natural gas 
revenue, combined with constraints placed on it by the influence of the Islamic ulama, prevented 
its entry into the narcotics business. The tendency non-separatist groups to create war economies 
of mutual economic interest between a rebels and the civilian population helps support 
hypothesis four, which argues that rebel groups maintain a non-separatist posture in the sense 
that they seek the perpetuation of conflict in order to maximize profit. 
 Strong evidence within the FARC and Shining Path cases points to the role of a state‟s 
weakness in motivating non-separatist goals and allowing rebel groups to establish zones of 
control where lootable resources can be produced. The FARC capitalized on the Colombian 
state‟s weakness in the rural llanos region in order to expand its influence among the population 
and in geographic terms, using the llanos region to produce drugs and as a military safe haven.  
In the late 1990s, FARC rebuffed the state‟s offer to enter peace negotiations because its 
leadership seems to have believed in the real possibility of state takeover.  In Peru, the historic 
lack of state presence in much the country‟s highland and jungle regions contributed to the ease 
with which Sendero‟s cadres infiltrated rural communities and overthrew government officials.  
The CRH used the Peruvian state‟s absence from the Huallaga Valley in order to take over and 
expand a drug based economy. The state‟s weak capacity allowed Sendero Luminoso to 
orchestrate its 1988 expansion into Peru‟s urban areas in what it viewed as the next to final stage 
in its Maoist strategy to overthrow the Peruvian government.  
 Hypothesis three supports the notion that the drug trade gives rebel groups financial 
benefits that allow them the operational independence to seek a takeover of the central 
government.  The strongest evidence for hypothesis three exists within the FARC case, where 
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rebel group gained access to military equipment and training that rivaled that of the Colombian 
government in the late 1990s. In Peru evidence also exists to support hypothesis three, in that 
CRH‟s reliance on high coca prices immunized it against the economic slump which eroded the 
Peruvian state‟s capacity in the 1980s.  In the Indonesia case, GAM suffered a clear financial 
disadvantage because of its relatively small tax base compared to the central government and its 
inability to access natural gas revenues.  
Hypothesis four contends that rebel groups maintain a non-separatist posture in the sense 
that they seek the perpetuation of conflict in order to maximize profit. Evidence gathered from 
the FARC and Shining Path cases supports the notion that rebel groups seek conflict perpetuation 
for profit maximization. Both insurgencies depend on drug revenue for their survival, while the 
ideological fervor that defined these rebel groups in their early history seems to have fizzled. The 
CRH‟s survival well beyond its non-drug trade involved parent organization further indicates the 
non-separatist profit motivation for conflict perpetuation.  The tendency of non-separatist civil 
conflicts involving substantial drug-related revenue to produce “chronic insurgencies” represents 
a key finding of this paper. Although rebel groups may shrink to only a fraction of the 
membership they once enjoyed, their mutual economic interests with even a narrow of the 
population permits them to perpetuate  conflict and their non-separatist goals for substantial 
periods of time.  
 The last hypothesis of this paper‟s theoretical framework, hypothesis five, revolves 
around the principal-agent and discipline problems produced within a rebel group by the 
presence of narcotics revenue.  Over the past decade, FARC has experienced a clear 
marginalization of its ideological roots in favor of a business focused posture. In addition, 
several high-profile defections involving the theft of large sums of drug-related money indicate a 
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discipline problem within the rebel organization. The discrepancy between the levels of 
discipline within the national Shining Path organization and the Huallaga Valley‟s drug-funded 
CRH Sendero offshoot offers the most compelling evidence of the way drug money produces 
discipline problems. Both the FARC and CRH appear either uninterested in peace or unable to 
impose an agreement on their lower ranks because of the operational independence provided by 
access to drug money. In contrast to CRH and FARC, the GAM maintained a high level  of 
central control and behavioral discipline throughout the civil conflict in Indonesia, a situation 
confirmed by the smoothness of its demobilization after the signing of a 2005 peace treaty.  
On the whole there are five key findings of this thesis, ranked in order of validity according 
to the three cases featured above: 
1. Evidence within the FARC and Shining Path cases points to the role of a state‟s weakness 
in motivating non-separatist goals and allowing rebel groups to establish zones of control 
where lootable resources can be produced. 
2. Non-separatist groups, such as the FARC and Shining Path, make conscious decisions to 
create war economies involving lootable resources in order to produce widespread 
economic benefits for the population of areas under their control. 
3. Strong support arises from the FARC and Shining Path cases for the notion that rebel 
groups seek conflict perpetuation for profit maximization, and may degenerate into 
“chronic insurgencies.” 
4. Both CRH and FARC exhibit principal-agent and discipline problems stemming from 
their involvement in the drug trade, while GAM maintained strong behavior discipline 
and central control throughout the duration of the Aceh conflict 
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This paper tests a theoretical framework based on the existing civil war literature against 
three cases in order to reveal the mechanisms, both internal and external, that produce the 
correlation between non-separatist rebel group goals and the presence of drug-related funding.  
Analysis of these micro level mechanisms represents a critical step in gaining a better 
understanding of how drug money affects rebel group goals and status vis-à-vis state 
governments. The pattern of “chronic insurgencies” emerging in drug-fueled non-separatist 
conflict deserves additional study and attention, from both policymakers and scholars alike. Such 
conflicts persist for long periods of time, destabilizing states and regions despite their generally 
low level of intensity.  
In addition, the evidence in this paper suggests that legalization of illegal substances in both 
drug-producing and consuming states would not alter the intensity or duration of non-separatist 
conflicts. Rebel organizations decide to utilize funding from lootable resources in order to build 
bases of support who share economic interests with their group. Efforts to build such bases of 
support through mutual economic interest would likely continue regardless of the legality of 
drugs, as the capacity of lootable resources to provide widespread economic benefits to a 
population and a rebel group makes their exploitation difficult to avoid. Although drug funding 
may give rebel groups temporary financial advantages over a central government, a pattern of 
outside intervention to states on the brink of collapse emerges in this paper. Second, it appears 
that over the long-term, drug money does not match the diverse tax base of an entire state in its 
ability to support large-scale armed hostilities.    
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